fix(opencode): let subagents use their own permissions (#31696)
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@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ export const layer = Layer.effect(
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Permission.fromConfig({
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question: "allow",
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plan_exit: "allow",
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task: {
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general: "deny",
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},
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external_directory: {
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[path.join(Global.Path.data, "plans", "*")]: "allow",
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},
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@ -1,31 +1,23 @@
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import { PermissionV1 } from "@opencode-ai/core/v1/permission"
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import type { Permission } from "../permission"
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import type { Agent } from "./agent"
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/**
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* Build the `permission` ruleset for a subagent's session when it's spawned
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* via the task tool. Combines:
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*
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* 1. The parent **agent's** edit-class deny rules — Plan Mode's file-edit
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* restriction lives on the agent ruleset, not on the session, so a
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* subagent that only inherited the parent SESSION's permission would
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* silently bypass it. (#26514)
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* 2. The parent **session's** deny rules and external_directory rules —
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* same forwarding the original code already did.
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* 3. Default `todowrite` and `task` denies if the subagent's own ruleset
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* 1. The parent session's deny rules and external_directory rules.
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* Parent agent restrictions only govern that agent; the subagent's own
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* permissions determine its capabilities.
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* 2. Default `todowrite` and `task` denies if the subagent's own ruleset
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* doesn't already permit them.
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*/
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export function deriveSubagentSessionPermission(input: {
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parentSessionPermission: PermissionV1.Ruleset
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parentAgent: Agent.Info | undefined
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subagent: Agent.Info
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}): PermissionV1.Ruleset {
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const canTask = input.subagent.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "task")
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const canTodo = input.subagent.permission.some((rule) => rule.permission === "todowrite")
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const parentAgentDenies =
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input.parentAgent?.permission.filter((rule) => rule.action === "deny" && rule.permission === "edit") ?? []
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return [
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...parentAgentDenies,
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...input.parentSessionPermission.filter(
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(rule) => rule.permission === "external_directory" || rule.action === "deny",
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),
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@ -122,12 +122,8 @@ export const TaskTool = Tool.define(
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? yield* sessions.get(SessionID.make(params.task_id)).pipe(Effect.catchCause(() => Effect.succeed(undefined)))
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: undefined
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const parent = yield* sessions.get(ctx.sessionID)
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const parentAgent = parent.agent
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? yield* agent.get(parent.agent).pipe(Effect.catchCause(() => Effect.succeed(undefined)))
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: undefined
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const childPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission: parent.permission ?? [],
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parentAgent,
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subagent: next,
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})
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const childToolDenies = [
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@ -85,6 +85,35 @@ it.instance("plan agent denies edits except .opencode/plans/*", () =>
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}),
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)
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it.instance("plan agent denies the general subagent by default", () =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const plan = yield* load((svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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expect(plan).toBeDefined()
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "general", plan!.permission).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "explore", plan!.permission).action).toBe("allow")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "custom", plan!.permission).action).toBe("allow")
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}),
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)
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it.instance(
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"user permission can allow the general subagent from plan mode",
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() =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const plan = yield* load((svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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expect(plan).toBeDefined()
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "general", plan!.permission).action).toBe("allow")
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}),
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{
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config: {
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permission: {
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task: {
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general: "allow",
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},
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},
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},
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},
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)
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it.instance("explore agent denies edit and write", () =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const explore = yield* load((svc) => svc.get("explore"))
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@ -1,24 +1,4 @@
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import { PermissionV1 } from "@opencode-ai/core/v1/permission"
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/**
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* Reproducer for opencode issue #26514:
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*
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* In Plan Mode (the `plan` agent), the main agent's edit/write tools are
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* blocked by the plan agent's permission ruleset (`edit: { "*": "deny" }`).
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* However, when the plan agent spawns a subagent via the `task` tool, the
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* subagent retains full file modification capabilities — a security bypass.
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*
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* This test replicates the permission ruleset that would govern a
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* `general` subagent when launched from a `plan` parent session, mirroring
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* the logic in `src/tool/task.ts` (filtered parent permissions ++ runtime
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* subagent agent permissions, evaluated as in `session/prompt.ts`).
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*
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* The expected (secure) behavior is that the subagent inherits the plan
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* mode read-only restriction and `edit`/`write` resolve to `deny`. On
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* origin/dev this assertion fails because the parent **agent** permissions
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* are not propagated to the subagent — only the parent **session**
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* permissions are passed through, and Plan Mode's restrictions live on the
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* agent, not the session.
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*/
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import { expect } from "bun:test"
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import { Effect } from "effect"
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import { Agent } from "../../src/agent/agent"
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@ -45,7 +25,7 @@ function testAgent(input: {
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// exercises the actual helper that task.ts uses to build the subagent's
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// session permission, so any regression in that helper trips this test.
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it.instance("[#26514] subagent spawned from plan mode inherits read-only restriction (edit denied)", () =>
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it.instance("subagent permissions take precedence over parent agent restrictions", () =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const planAgent = yield* Agent.use.get("plan")
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const generalAgent = yield* Agent.use.get("general")
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@ -57,15 +37,10 @@ it.instance("[#26514] subagent spawned from plan mode inherits read-only restric
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// tool layer — see Permission.disabled / EDIT_TOOLS.)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", planAgent!.permission).action).toBe("deny")
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// Simulate the plan-mode parent session: in real flow the plan
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// session's `permission` field is empty (Plan Mode lives on the agent
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// ruleset, not the session). So we pass [] through as the parent
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// session permission, exactly like the actual code path.
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const parentSessionPermission: PermissionV1.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: generalAgent!,
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})
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@ -73,40 +48,29 @@ it.instance("[#26514] subagent spawned from plan mode inherits read-only restric
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// ruleset: Permission.merge(agent.permission, session.permission ?? [])
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const effective = Permission.merge(generalAgent!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/another/path/index.tsx", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).not.toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.disabled(["edit", "write", "apply_patch"], effective)).toEqual(new Set())
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}),
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)
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it.instance("[#26514] explore subagent launched from plan mode also stays read-only", () =>
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// Sibling check: even though `explore` is intrinsically read-only, the
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// bug surface is the same. Including this case to document that the fix
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// should propagate the parent **agent** permissions, not just deny edit
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// when the subagent happens to already deny it.
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it.instance("subagent's own read-only restriction remains effective", () =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const planAgent = yield* Agent.use.get("plan")
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const explore = yield* Agent.use.get("explore")
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
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expect(explore).toBeDefined()
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const parentSessionPermission: PermissionV1.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: explore!,
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})
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const effective = Permission.merge(explore!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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// Already deny — sanity check.
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/x.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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}),
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)
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it.instance(
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"[#26514] custom user subagent launched from plan mode bypasses Plan Mode read-only",
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// The most damaging case: a user-defined subagent with default
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// permissions (allow-by-default, like `general`). The subagent must NOT
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// be able to edit when the parent agent is `plan`.
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"custom subagent can explicitly enable edits denied to its parent agent",
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() =>
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Effect.gen(function* () {
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const planAgent = yield* Agent.use.get("plan")
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@ -117,14 +81,13 @@ it.instance(
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const parentSessionPermission: PermissionV1.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: my!,
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})
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const effective = Permission.merge(my!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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// BUG: on origin/dev edit resolves to "allow" because the plan
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// agent's `edit: deny *` rule never reaches the subagent.
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", planAgent!.permission).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("allow")
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expect(Permission.disabled(["edit", "write", "apply_patch"], effective)).toEqual(new Set())
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}),
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{
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config: {
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@ -132,29 +95,17 @@ it.instance(
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my_subagent: {
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description: "A user-defined subagent",
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mode: "subagent",
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permission: {
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edit: "allow",
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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)
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it.effect("[#26700] controller self-restrictions do not erase executor permissions", () =>
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it.effect("subagent self permissions are preserved", () =>
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Effect.sync(() => {
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const controller = testAgent({
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name: "controller",
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mode: "primary",
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permission: {
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"*": "deny",
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read: "deny",
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bash: "deny",
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task: {
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"*": "deny",
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executor: "allow",
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},
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edit: "deny",
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write: "deny",
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},
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})
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const executor = testAgent({
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name: "executor",
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mode: "subagent",
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@ -166,8 +117,7 @@ it.effect("[#26700] controller self-restrictions do not erase executor permissio
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"*": "deny",
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worker: "allow",
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},
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edit: "deny",
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write: "deny",
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edit: "allow",
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},
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})
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@ -175,7 +125,6 @@ it.effect("[#26700] controller self-restrictions do not erase executor permissio
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executor.permission,
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deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission: [],
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parentAgent: controller,
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subagent: executor,
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}),
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)
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@ -184,9 +133,7 @@ it.effect("[#26700] controller self-restrictions do not erase executor permissio
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expect(Permission.evaluate("bash", "git status", effective).action).toBe("allow")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "worker", effective).action).toBe("allow")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("task", "other", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.disabled(["edit", "write", "apply_patch"], effective)).toEqual(
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new Set(["edit", "write", "apply_patch"]),
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)
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expect(Permission.disabled(["edit", "write", "apply_patch"], effective)).toEqual(new Set())
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}),
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)
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@ -203,7 +150,6 @@ it.effect("subagent inherits parent session deny rules as hard runtime ceilings"
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executor.permission,
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deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission: Permission.fromConfig({ bash: "deny" }),
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parentAgent: undefined,
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subagent: executor,
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}),
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)
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