Commit Graph

422 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
yuneng-jiang
f1667b9137
chore(deps): bump deps (#29860)
* bump: version 0.4.73 → 0.4.74

* bump: version 1.88.0 → 1.89.0

* uv lock
2026-06-06 21:44:54 +00:00
Mateo Wang
4ec4ab99d0
feat(mcp): per-server env vars with global + per-user scopes (#28917) 2026-06-05 20:15:11 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
d671a09c20
Litellm oss staging 050626 (#29774)
* Mark xAI models retiring on 2026-05-15 (#28788)

Per https://docs.x.ai/developers/migration/may-15-retirement, xAI is
retiring the following slugs on 2026-05-15 (auto-redirect to grok-4.3
with various reasoning efforts; callers continuing to use the old slugs
will be billed at grok-4.3 pricing):

  grok-4-1-fast-reasoning{,-latest}      -> grok-4.3 (low effort)
  grok-4-1-fast-non-reasoning{,-latest}  -> grok-4.3 (none)
  grok-4-fast-reasoning                  -> grok-4.3 (low effort)
  grok-4-fast-non-reasoning              -> grok-4.3 (none)
  grok-4-0709                            -> grok-4.3 (low effort)
  grok-code-fast-1{,-0825}               -> grok-build-0.1
  grok-3                                 -> grok-4.3 (none)

Only the direct xai/ slugs are tagged; third-party hosts (azure_ai,
oci, vercel_ai_gateway, perplexity/xai) run their own schedules. The
grok-3 retirement list explicitly names only the base grok-3 slug — the
-mini / -fast / -beta / -latest variants are not listed, so they remain
untouched.

* feat(moonshot): advertise json_schema response support on live models (#29683)

litellm.responses() already routes Moonshot through the responses->chat-completions
bridge, and Moonshot honors response_format json_schema on chat completions. The
cost-map entries left supports_response_schema unset, so discovery layers that gate
on that flag dropped Moonshot from structured-output / responses listings even though
the capability works end to end.

Set supports_response_schema on the nine models currently live on api.moonshot.ai:
kimi-k2.5, kimi-k2.6, the moonshot-v1 8k/32k/128k text and vision-preview variants,
and moonshot-v1-auto. Verified against the live API that each honors json_schema and
that litellm.responses() returns schema-valid structured output through the bridge.

* chore(moonshot): mark models retired from api.moonshot.ai as deprecated (#29685)

Thirteen Moonshot/Kimi models in the cost map no longer resolve on
api.moonshot.ai (all return 404). Stamp each with its deprecation_date from
platform.kimi.ai/docs/models rather than deleting the entries, so historical
cost calculation keeps resolving the names while tooling can surface the
retirement.

Dates: kimi-thinking-preview 2025-11-11; kimi-latest and its 8k/32k/128k context
variants 2026-01-28; the kimi-k2 preview/turbo/thinking series 2026-05-25; the
moonshot-v1 -0430 snapshots use their own 2024-04-30 snapshot date (Moonshot
publishes no discontinuation date for them).

* fix(moonshot): drop temperature for reasoning models (kimi-k2.5/k2.6) (#29687)

Kimi reasoning models reject every temperature except 1; a request with
temperature=0.2 returns "invalid temperature: only 1 is allowed for this model".
litellm only clamped temperature into [0.3, 1], so any value below 1 still 400'd.

Drop the temperature param entirely for reasoning models (gated on
supports_reasoning, the same signal transform_request already uses) so the model
default is used; the non-reasoning moonshot-v1 models keep the existing clamp.

Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>

* feat(mcp): add per-server timeout configuration (#29672)

* feat(mcp): add per-server timeout configuration

* fix(mcp): address timeout field review comments

- use is not None guard instead of or for 0.0 edge case
- copy timeout in both LiteLLM_MCPServerTable constructions (health check path + _build_mcp_server_table)
- add timeout Float? column to all three schema.prisma files
- extend round-trip test to cover _build_mcp_server_table direction
- add test for zero timeout not treated as falsy

* fix(mcp): forward timeout in _build_temporary_mcp_server_record

* fix(mcp): return 504 instead of 500 when per-server timeout fires

* test(mcp): add 504 timeout regression test; fix black formatting

* Add jp. Bedrock cross-region inference profile for claude-opus-4-7 (#28567)

* fix(thinking): handle None thinking param in is_thinking_enabled (#28598)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from Terrajlz's PR.

* feat(helm): support tpl rendering in podAnnotations (#28609)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from devauxbr's PR.

* Forward custom_llm_provider through the Responses API bridge (Fixes #28505) (#28575)

* Forward custom_llm_provider through the Responses API bridge (Fixes #28505)

When a Chat Completions request to a GPT-5.4+ model contains both
`tools` and `reasoning_effort`, `completion()` auto-routes through
`responses_api_bridge`. The bridge handler called
`litellm.responses()` / `litellm.aresponses()` without forwarding the
already-resolved `custom_llm_provider`, so the downstream call
re-invoked `get_llm_provider()` with `custom_llm_provider=None` and
stripped a second provider prefix from a `provider/provider/model`
deployment string.

For a deployment configured as `openai/openai/openai/gpt-5.5`,
the bridge flow sent `openai/gpt-5.5` to the upstream API instead of
the correct `openai/openai/gpt-5.5`. Upstream APIs that enforce
model-name allow-lists rejected this as `key_model_access_denied`.

Fix: pass the locally-resolved `custom_llm_provider` into both the
sync `responses()` and async `aresponses()` calls so the downstream
`_resolve_model_provider_for_responses` sees an explicit provider
and skips the second prefix-strip.

New regression test
`tests/test_litellm/completion_extras/test_responses_bridge_provider_propagation.py`
pins both call sites: each must forward `custom_llm_provider`.

* fix(28505): set custom_llm_provider on request_data instead of as duplicate kwarg

Greptile flagged that the previous patch passed custom_llm_provider as an
explicit kwarg to responses()/aresponses() while request_data already
carried it via the spread of sanitized_litellm_params, which would raise
TypeError: got multiple values for keyword argument on every real bridge
call.

Switches to assigning request_data['custom_llm_provider'] before the call
so the resolved provider wins over whatever sanitized_litellm_params spread
in, without duplicating the kwarg.

Updates the regression test to seed request_data with a sentinel
custom_llm_provider so it actually exercises the overwrite path (the
previous test mocked transform_request with a minimal dict and never hit
the conflict).

* chore: trigger shin-agent re-eval on retargeted staging base

* chore: trigger shin-agent re-eval against updated Greptile state

* Add jp. Bedrock cross-region inference profile for claude-opus-4-7

AWS Bedrock documents jp.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7 alongside the
existing us./eu./au./global. profiles for Claude Opus 4.7
(ap-northeast-1 Tokyo / ap-northeast-3 Osaka), but the entry is
missing from model_prices_and_context_window.json. Tokyo-region
users currently get an "unknown model" error when routing through
the JP geo profile.

Adds the entry to both the canonical file and the bundled backup,
mirroring the recent pattern for sonnet-4-6 (#27831). Pricing matches
the other regional profiles (10% premium over base/global).

Regression test pins all six documented profiles (base, global, us, eu,
au, jp) and asserts pricing parity between jp. and au. variants.

Source: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-card-anthropic-claude-opus-4-7.html

---------

Co-authored-by: Terrajlz <info@jouleselectrictech.com>
Co-authored-by: Bruno Devaux <devaux.br@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>

* feat(soniox): add soniox audio transcription integration (#29508)

* feat(openmeter): add OPENMETER_TRUST_REQUEST_USER to prevent forged attribution (#29650)

The OpenMeter callback resolves the CloudEvent subject from kwargs["user"]
first, then falls back to the key-bound user_api_key_user_id. For
multi-tenant proxy deployments, a client can set `"user": "..."` in the
request body and cause their usage to be attributed to that arbitrary
string — a billing-attribution forgery risk.

Adds OPENMETER_TRUST_REQUEST_USER env var (default "true" for backward
compatibility). When set to "false", the request-supplied `user` field is
ignored and the subject is resolved solely from user_api_key_user_id.

Matches the existing env-var-driven config pattern in this file
(OPENMETER_API_KEY, OPENMETER_API_ENDPOINT, OPENMETER_EVENT_TYPE).

* feat(search): add you_com as a search provider (#28370)

* feat(search): add you_com as a search provider

Registers You.com Search API as a first-class `search_provider` in the
`search_tools` registry, alongside Tavily, Exa, Perplexity, etc.

- New adapter: litellm/llms/you_com/search/transformation.py
  - POSTs to https://ydc-index.io/v1/search
  - Auth: X-API-Key from YOUCOM_API_KEY (or explicit api_key)
  - Maps Perplexity unified spec: max_results -> count,
    search_domain_filter -> include_domains, country -> country
  - Flattens results.web + results.news into a single SearchResult list;
    snippet prefers snippets[0], falls back to description; page_age -> date
- Registry: SearchProviders.YOU_COM in litellm/types/utils.py and wired
  into ProviderConfigManager.get_provider_search_config()
- Pricing entry: model_prices_and_context_window.json (placeholder $0.0;
  happy to adjust to maintainers' preferred public number)
- Docs: example router config snippet and example proxy yaml updated
- Tests: tests/search_tests/test_you_com_search.py - 5 mocked tests
  (payload shape, domain filter mapping, snippet fallback, news flattening,
  missing-api-key error)

Refs upstream expansion signal: #15942

* review fixups: normalize api_base, lowercase country, scope env-var to test

Addresses Greptile inline review comments on #28370:

- get_complete_url: strip trailing slashes from api_base *before* the
  endswith("/v1/search") check, so a custom base like ".../v1/search/"
  doesn't become ".../v1/search/v1/search".
- transform_search_request: .lower() country before sending, matching
  Tavily's convention so callers using the unified spec form ("US") get
  consistent behavior across providers.
- Tests: replace direct os.environ writes with an autouse monkeypatch
  fixture so YOUCOM_API_KEY is set per-test and removed afterwards.
  The missing-key test now uses monkeypatch.delenv. New test asserts the
  trailing-slash normalization above.

Reverts the ARCHITECTURE.md / example yaml edits per the reviewer note
that documentation changes belong in the litellm-docs repo.

* support keyless free tier (api.you.com/v1/agents/search) as default

You.com offers an IP-throttled keyless endpoint that returns the same
response shape as the keyed one (~100 queries/day, no signup). This is a
significant onboarding lever - mirrors the keyless DuckDuckGo/SearXNG
providers already in the search_tools registry.

Behavior:
- YOUCOM_API_KEY set        -> keyed:  POST https://ydc-index.io/v1/search
                                       (X-API-Key header)
- no key                    -> free:   POST https://api.you.com/v1/agents/search
                                       (no auth)
- YOUCOM_API_BASE override  -> honored as-is

Tests:
- New: test_you_com_search_keyless_free_tier - asserts URL + absence of
  X-API-Key when no key is configured.
- New: test_you_com_search_validate_environment_keyless - asserts the
  config no longer raises when the key is absent.
- Removed: test_you_com_search_raises_without_api_key (the precondition
  no longer holds).
- Existing payload/domain-filter/etc tests still cover keyed mode via
  the autouse YOUCOM_API_KEY fixture.

Verified both endpoints accept POST + return identical JSON shape:
  results.web[] / results.news[] with title, url, snippets, description,
  page_age.

* register you_com in provider_endpoints_support.json

Adding `litellm/llms/you_com/` requires a corresponding entry in
provider_endpoints_support.json or the
code-quality/check_provider_folders_documented CI check fails.

Follows the compact tavily/serper pattern - endpoints: { search: true }.
Local run of the check now reports "All 114 provider folders are documented".

* move tests under tests/test_litellm/llms/ so CI exercises them

The litellm CI workflows scope unit tests to `tests/test_litellm/...`
(see test-unit-llm-providers.yml: `tests/test_litellm/llms` path), so
tests living under `tests/search_tests/` are never run in CI - which is
why codecov reports 0% patch coverage for the new adapter even though
the unit tests exist and pass locally.

Move test_you_com_search.py into `tests/test_litellm/llms/you_com/` so
the test-unit-llm-providers job picks it up. 7/7 tests still pass at
the new location.

(Sibling search-only providers - tavily, exa_ai, brave, etc. - still
live only in `tests/search_tests/` and would benefit from the same
move, but that is out of scope for this PR.)

* fix(you_com): pin Accept-Encoding: identity to dodge keyless gzip bug

The keyless free-tier endpoint (api.you.com/v1/agents/search) advertises
Content-Encoding: gzip but returns a body that httpx's decoder rejects
with `zlib.error: Error -3 while decompressing data: incorrect header
check`, surfacing as litellm.APIConnectionError in user code. curl works
because it doesn't request compression by default.

Pin Accept-Encoding: identity in validate_environment so the upstream
server skips compression entirely. Harmless on the keyed endpoint
(ydc-index.io/v1/search) which negotiates content-encoding correctly.

The header uses setdefault so a caller-supplied Accept-Encoding still
takes precedence. (Server-side bug has been flagged to the You.com team
separately - once fixed there, this workaround can be removed.)

New unit test: test_you_com_search_pins_identity_accept_encoding.

---------

Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>

* docs: fix README typo (#29419)

Correct clear spelling mistakes in documentation without changing behavior.

Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Tested: git diff --check; uvx codespell on changed files
Not-tested: Full docs build not run; text-only changes

* Fix(langfuse): pass httpx_client to Langfuse in langfuse_prompt_management to respect SSL_VERIFY (#29480)

* fix(langfuse): pass ssl_verify to Langfuse httpx client

* fix_langfuse_

* add unit tests

* addressed comments

---------

Co-authored-by: shin-berri <shin-laptop@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>

* feat(models): add minimax/MiniMax-M3 to model cost map (#29412)

Add MiniMax's new flagship MiniMax-M3 to the native minimax provider:
512K context, 128K max output, native multimodal (supports_vision),
reasoning, prompt caching. Pricing (USD/M tokens): input 0.6 / output
2.4 / cache read 0.12. M3 has no active prompt-cache-write tier, so
cache_creation_input_token_cost is omitted.

Updated both the root model_prices_and_context_window.json (remote
source) and the bundled litellm/model_prices_and_context_window_backup.json
(local fallback), keeping them in sync.

* fix(logging): handle ResponseCompletedEvent in anthropic_messages streaming spend log (#29394)

* fix(logging): handle ResponseCompletedEvent in anthropic_messages streaming spend log

* fix(logging): extend terminal event handling to ResponseIncompleteEvent and ResponseFailedEvent; fix return type annotation

* feat(provider): Add Neosantara provider as OpenAI Compatible (#29646)

* Add Neosantara provider

* Register Neosantara provider enum

* Address Neosantara provider review feedback

* Add Neosantara packaged endpoint support

---------

Co-authored-by: shin-berri <shin-laptop@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>

* fix: address greptile and veria review feedback

- langfuse: guard httpx_client injection behind version check (>= 2.7.3)
- soniox: propagate audio_transcription_duration in _hidden_params for spend tracking
- soniox: give SONIOX_API_BASE env var priority over caller-supplied api_base
- mcp: replace CancelledError catch with asyncio.wait_for + TimeoutError

* chore(mcp): add migration for per-server timeout column

* fix(test): add tool_use_system_prompt_tokens to model prices schema validator

* fix: mcp timeout test uses real asyncio.wait_for timeout; you_com get_complete_url respects resolved api_key

* fix: forward resolved api_key into you_com endpoint selection and apply timeout to soniox polling GETs

The search flow resolves api_key in validate_environment but never passed it
into get_complete_url, so a programmatic api_key (with no YOUCOM_API_KEY in the
env) set the X-API-Key header yet still selected the keyless free-tier endpoint.
Forward api_key through both the search entrypoint and the http handler so the
keyed endpoint is chosen.

HTTPHandler.get/AsyncHTTPHandler.get had no timeout parameter, so the Soniox
poll and transcript-fetch GETs silently used the client global default instead
of the caller timeout. Add a per-request timeout to get() and forward the
configured timeout from the Soniox handler.

* fix(soniox): price stt-async-v4 per second so transcriptions are billed

The handler stores audio_transcription_duration in _hidden_params, but the
model carried only token cost fields and the response has no token usage, so
the transcription cost path fell through to cost_per_second and returned $0.
An authenticated caller could transcribe Soniox audio without decrementing
their budget. Switch the entry to output_cost_per_second at Soniox's published
$0.10/hour async rate so the stored duration produces a real charge.

* fix(langfuse): use a dedicated httpx client for the SDK injection

The httpx_client handed to the Langfuse SDK came from _get_httpx_client(),
which returns LiteLLM's globally cached HTTPHandler. If Langfuse closed that
client on teardown it would invalidate the shared client used by every other
LiteLLM HTTP call. Build a dedicated httpx.Client instead, still resolving SSL
verification and client certificate from LiteLLM's configuration.

* fix(soniox): prefer caller-supplied api_base over SONIOX_API_BASE env var

* fix(cohere): support max_completion_tokens on cohere v2 chat (default route) (#29779)

* fix(cohere): support max_completion_tokens on cohere v2 chat

The default cohere_chat route resolves to CohereV2ChatConfig, which did not
list or map max_completion_tokens, so get_optional_params raised
UnsupportedParamsError for the standard OpenAI parameter (the modern
replacement for the deprecated max_tokens). The v1 config already maps it to
cohere's max_tokens; mirror that in v2 and add v2 regression tests.

* fix(cohere): make max_completion_tokens take precedence over max_tokens on v2

When both max_tokens and max_completion_tokens are supplied, prefer
max_completion_tokens explicitly rather than relying on dict iteration order,
and cover both orderings with a regression test.

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel Yudelevich <4537920+yudelevi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: hectorc98 <hector.chamorroalvarez@adyen.com>
Co-authored-by: Filippo Menghi <113345637+Cyberfilo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrajlz <info@jouleselectrictech.com>
Co-authored-by: Bruno Devaux <devaux.br@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dan Lemon <dan@danlemon.com>
Co-authored-by: Saswat <saswatds@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brian Sparker <brainsparker@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhao73 <156770117+Zhao73@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Urain Ahmad Shah <60431964+urainshah@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: shin-berri <shin-laptop@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: kape <168134658+kapelame@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: danisalvaa <159898202+danisalvaa@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Just R <remixingmagelang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: abhay23-AI <abhaytrivedi22@gmail.com>
2026-06-05 13:51:51 -07:00
michelligabriele
3f79222350
fix(proxy): persist oauth2_flow on MCP server registration (#29690) 2026-06-05 18:52:52 +05:30
Mateo Wang
6d6eda8101
[internal copy of #28008] Support MCP OAuth passthrough and issuer-scoped JWT auth (#28356)
* fix(proxy): point /metrics 401 at the opt-out flag

Operators upgrading past 35bbca60b0 (which made /metrics auth
default-on) see "Malformed API Key passed in. Ensure Key has 'Bearer '
prefix." with no hint that
litellm_settings.require_auth_for_metrics_endpoint: false restores the
previous unauthenticated behavior. Append that discovery hint to the
existing 401 body so a Prometheus scraper that breaks after upgrade
has a clear migration path. No behavior change.

* fix(proxy): bound budget reservation per request instead of pinning to remaining headroom

reserve_budget_for_request fell back to reserving the entire remaining
team/key/user headroom whenever a request omitted max_tokens, which
pinned the spend counter at max_budget for the duration of the
in-flight request and false-positive-blocked every concurrent or
back-to-back request until the success callback reconciled. Surfaced
as an integration-test team being budget-blocked at its $2000 cap
while DB spend was $0.144.

Switch the missing-max_tokens path to a fixed default of 16384 output
tokens (mirrors parallel_request_limiter_v3's DEFAULT_MAX_TOKENS_ESTIMATE
precedent), and clamp explicit max_tokens at the model's
max_output_tokens for reservation accounting only. The outbound request
body is unchanged, so providers see whatever the caller actually sent;
only the local integer used to compute reservation cost is bounded.
This also prevents a hostile max_tokens=999999999 from inflating one
request's reservation up to the entire team headroom.

For Opus 4.7 (output $25/M, max_output 128K) on a $2000 budget the
worst-case per-request reservation drops from "everything left" to
$3.20, raising admittable concurrency from 1 to ~625.

* fix(proxy): reserve per-image cost for image-generation requests

Image-generation routes (dall-e-3, flux, etc.) have no per-token output
cost so they fell through to the no-reservation read-time-only path.
Concurrent image requests against a depleted budget could all pass
common_checks (counter exactly at max_budget passes the strict-`>`
gate) and reach the provider before reconciliation caught up.

Add per-image reservation in _estimate_request_max_cost_for_model:
when the model has a per-image cost field, reserve `n × cost_per_image`
upfront. The atomic counter increment serializes concurrent admissions,
so the second request sees the post-first-reservation counter and
raises BudgetExceededError instead of silently leaking through.

Both `output_cost_per_image` and `input_cost_per_image` are honored —
naming is inconsistent across providers (OpenAI dall-e-3 uses
input_cost_per_image, aiml/dall-e-3 uses output_cost_per_image for
the same per-generated-image price).

Per-pixel pricing (DALL-E 2 size variants) and TTS/STT routes still
fall through to read-time enforcement; those are follow-ups.

* fix(proxy): gate image-gen reservation strictly on model mode

The previous detection treated any model with input_cost_per_image
or output_cost_per_image as image generation. Several chat and
embedding models carry those fields to price multimodal vision input,
not generated images:

- gemini-3.1-pro-preview (mode=chat) has output_cost_per_image=0.00012
  alongside input/output token pricing.
- azure/gpt-realtime-* (mode=chat) has input_cost_per_image=5e-6.
- amazon.titan-embed-image-v1 (mode=embedding) has
  input_cost_per_image=6e-5.

For these models the image-gen branch fired first and reserved a
fraction of a cent per request, short-circuiting the token-priced
path entirely. Long Gemini chats reserved 1 × $0.00012 instead of
the true token cost.

Gate strictly on mode in {"image_generation", "image_edit"}. All 197
real image_generation entries and all 31 image_edit entries
(Flux Kontext, Stability inpaint/outpaint, etc.) carry the right mode,
so the field-presence fallback was unnecessary.

Adds regression tests for the chat-model-with-image-cost-field case
and for image_edit reservation.

* build(packaging): relax core runtime pins to ranges

Backport of #27241 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

The 12 entries in `[project.dependencies]` were exact `==` pins, a side
effect of the Poetry -> uv migration. This forces every downstream
package that lists litellm as a dependency to downgrade common runtime
libraries (openai, pydantic, aiohttp, click, jsonschema, ...) to the
exact versions we ship.

Switch to lower-bounded ranges with upper bounds where the upstream
package is pre-1.0 or has a known breaking-major-version policy.
Reproducibility for our Docker proxy and CI continues to come from
`uv.lock`, which is regenerated here as a metadata-only diff.

Conflict resolution vs upstream merge:
- The upstream merge commit also surfaced unrelated context entries
  (nvidia-riva-client, soundfile/stt-nvidia-riva extra) that exist in
  staging but not in rc2. Those are not part of #27241's intent and
  were dropped from the resolution; the rc2 uv.lock keeps its existing
  entry set, only the 12 specifier strings changed.
- `uv lock --check` passes (392 packages resolved, no drift).

* build(packaging): raise jinja2 floor to 3.1.6

Our `uv.lock` already resolves jinja2 to 3.1.6, so Docker / CI installs
get that version. The `pyproject.toml` floor was lagging at 3.1.0,
which means downstream consumers using `--resolution=lowest-direct` or
older constraint files can land on 3.1.0-3.1.5 instead of the version
we actually test against.

Aligns the declared floor with the resolved version so external
installers see the same baseline our test matrix exercises.

`uv lock` diff is metadata-only (no resolved-version drift).

* fix(mcp): forward extra_headers for OpenAPI MCP tools

OpenAPI-generated tools only applied static closure headers and BYOK
Authorization via ContextVar. Copy MCPServer.extra_headers from the
incoming MCP request into _request_extra_headers (set in server.py before
local tool dispatch), merge in openapi_to_mcp_generator via a small helper.

OAuth2 M2M: do not forward caller Authorization from raw_headers (same rule
as _prepare_mcp_server_headers for managed MCP).

Adds TestRequestExtraHeaders and clarifies mcp_server_manager registration
comment.

Fixes #26794

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* refactor(mcp): access has_client_credentials on MCPServer directly

Greptile: getattr default was redundant; property exists on MCPServer and
mcp_server is non-None inside the extra_headers forwarding block.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(mcp): static headers win over forwarded headers in OpenAPI MCP

Match the existing MCP invariant in merge_mcp_headers and the managed MCP
path: operator-configured static headers always override caller-forwarded
headers on name conflict, with case-insensitive comparison so different
casing cannot bypass the precedence. _request_auth_header (BYOK) still
overrides Authorization last.

Addresses Veria review on PR #27383.

Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): always merge caller-supplied tags into request metadata

Caller-supplied tags (`x-litellm-tags` header, body `tags`, `metadata.tags`)
were silently dropped unless the key/team had
`metadata.allow_client_tags: true` set. Restore the documented behavior:
tags from the request always flow into `metadata.tags` and union with any
admin-configured static tags from key/team/project metadata.

Removes the `allow_client_tags` opt-in flag from the pre-call pipeline.
The flag was only ever read here; it has no schema or endpoint footprint,
so leftover values in existing key metadata are inert.

Test cleanup mirrors the simplification: drop the three tests that
verified the strip-when-not-opted-in path, drop the `allow_client_tags`
fixture lines from the merge/union tests.

* docs(proxy): refresh stale comments referencing removed tag strip

The tag-strip block was removed in the parent commit but two surrounding
comments still referenced "tags without opt-in" and "runs AFTER the
strip". Update them to describe the remaining user_api_key_* and
_pipeline_managed_guardrails strip that the snapshot/merge ordering
actually protects against.

* chore: reject bare str at file-input sinks to prevent local-file read (#27762)

Cherry-pick of #27762 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

* chore: reject bare str at file-input sinks to prevent local-file read (#27667)
* fix: use os.PathLike in ocr sink and check truthy reasoningSummary for bridge
  - ocr/main.py: widen Path check to os.PathLike for consistency with other sinks
  - main.py: bridge condition checks truthiness of reasoning_summary, not just None
* fix: remove unused pathlib.Path import in ocr/main.py

Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com>

* Strip SERVER_ROOT_PATH before lazy-feature prefix match

LazyFeatureMiddleware compared the raw scope path against registered
prefixes (e.g. /policies), so requests under a server root path like
/api/v1/policies/... never matched, the feature never loaded, and the
endpoint returned 404. Strip the configured root path before matching,
normalizing trailing slashes and enforcing a component boundary so
/api does not falsely match /apiv2.

* Cache normalized SERVER_ROOT_PATH at middleware init

SERVER_ROOT_PATH is a process-startup env var. Read it once in
__init__ instead of calling get_server_root_path() + rstrip on every
request that arrives before all lazy features have loaded.

* chore(proxy): backport /key/regenerate ownership-rebind + premium-gate guards (#27793)

Backport of #27793 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

A non-admin caller could rebind their own key's user_id via /key/regenerate.
_execute_virtual_key_regeneration had org/team guards but no user_id guard,
and prepare_key_update_data did not strip the field — it survived
model_dump(exclude_unset=True) into the Prisma update. On the next request,
_return_user_api_key_auth_obj resolved the rebound user_id against
litellm_usertable and returned PROXY_ADMIN whenever the target row's
user_role was admin.

/key/update had the equivalent guard inline at _validate_update_key_data;
extract it to a shared helper _validate_caller_can_change_key_ownership and
call from both /key/update and _execute_virtual_key_regeneration.

Also tighten the premium gate that allowed the master-key rotation branch to
skip the enterprise check. The previous predicate was a field-presence test,
not an identity check. Verify the caller actually holds the master key via
_is_master_key before allowing the non-premium path.

Block explicit-null user_id and empty-string user_id as removal attempts;
both 403-reject for non-admin callers.

* fix(proxy): expose db status on public /health/readiness

Backport of #27866 onto litellm_1.84.0rc2.

External readiness probes consumed the legacy detailed payload's `db`
field to drive alerting and pod-rotation decisions. Stripping the body
to {"status": "healthy"} broke those probes silently — the HTTP code
still flipped to 503, but probes checking body.db == "connected"
treated the response as healthy.

Add `db` back to the unauthenticated payload. The rest of the diagnostic
fields (litellm_version, callbacks, cache, log_level) stay behind
/health/readiness/details so the recon-leak gate from #26912 holds.
Values match the legacy contract: "connected", "disconnected",
"Not connected". The 503-on-DB-disconnect behavior from LIT-2607 is
preserved.

* fix(ui): fetch version + debug flag from /health/readiness/details

The proxy moved `litellm_version`, `is_detailed_debug`, and other
diagnostic fields off the public `/health/readiness` payload behind
an auth-gated `/health/readiness/details` endpoint. The navbar
version tag and the detailed-debug-mode banner stopped working
because they were still reading those fields from the unauthed
response, which no longer contains them.

Replace `useHealthReadiness` with a `useHealthReadinessDetails`
hook that takes an `accessToken` argument and sends a Bearer header
to the auth-gated endpoint. The hook stays disabled while
`accessToken` is falsy, so the navbar can keep rendering on the
public model hub (where the token is null) without triggering an
auth redirect or a 401-loop.

* fix(ui): disable retries on readiness/details + cover token forwarding

Two small follow-ups on the readiness/details migration:

- Set `retry: false` on the query. The payload feeds a passive
  navbar tag and a debug banner; a 401 from an expired token
  shouldn't fan out into three retries against the proxy.
- Add navbar specs that assert the `accessToken` prop is forwarded
  into the hook (matches the DebugWarningBanner spec). Without
  this, the navbar could silently regress to passing `undefined`
  and the existing tests wouldn't catch it.

* chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-14 03:52 UTC, node v20.20.2)

* Merge pull request #27898 from stuxf/chore/banned-params-extra-body-cover

chore(proxy): cover extra_body + azure_ad_token in banned-params check

(cherry picked from commit a6a9d8edf0)

* Merge pull request #27801 from stuxf/chore/get-instance-fn-runtime-s3-gate

chore(proxy): refuse remote-URL instance-fn loads outside config-file path

(cherry picked from commit e3e5209f51)

* fix: block client-side pricing injection via request body

Authenticated clients could supply CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields
(input_cost_per_token, output_cost_per_token, etc.) in the request body.
These were forwarded to register_model() in main.py, permanently mutating
the shared global litellm.model_cost dict for all users on the instance.

Adds all CustomPricingLiteLLMParams fields to _BANNED_REQUEST_BODY_PARAMS
so is_request_body_safe() rejects them before they reach completion().
New pricing fields added to CustomPricingLiteLLMParams are auto-covered.

Admin opt-in via allow_client_side_credentials or
configurable_clientside_auth_params still works as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF fields in RAG ingest vector_store config

aws_sts_endpoint, aws_web_identity_token, and aws_bedrock_runtime_endpoint
in ingest_options.vector_store were passed directly to the Bedrock ingestion
class, which reads them into boto3 STS client construction. Any authenticated
caller could redirect AssumeRole calls to an attacker-controlled server,
leaking the proxy's instance profile credentials.

Calls is_request_body_safe() on ingest_options["vector_store"] before
forwarding to litellm.aingest(). Same banned-params list and admin opt-in
escape hatch (allow_client_side_credentials) as the /chat/completions path.
ValueError from the safety check is caught and re-raised as HTTP 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)

* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route

Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed
Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as
`http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/"
is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable
without authentication.

Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line,
not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path
deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"],
mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic.

Affected variants confirmed fixed:
  Host: localhost/?x=1
  Host: localhost:4000/?x=1
  Host: localhost/#test
  Host: localhost:4000/#test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: reduce comments in route fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options

Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.)
in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with
a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side.

Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict
with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an
arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an
attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials
refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users

Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could
update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. —
without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation.

Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own
key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless
of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options

A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server
to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an
attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF.

Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and
the existing credential fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check

Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config
(aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have
the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

- Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles)
- Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins
- Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request

Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass
aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to
/utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured
provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK
credential resolution.

Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints.
Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter

Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into
optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing
is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set
api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the
provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host.

Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after
optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.
ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py

Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check

_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently
skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via
multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.)
nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe.

_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses
JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route

mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring)
so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic,
azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the
admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check.

Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read
masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential).

Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used
everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a
passthrough prefix are allowed through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures

- key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so
  team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields.
  can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team
  membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin
  check on a team key means the caller was authorized.

- test: set created_by on mock key in
  test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so
  caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id).

- auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope
  (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into
  UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation.

- ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard
  in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy

scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly.
Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent

auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"]
to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would
remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"),
breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes.
Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/".

migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration
is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column.
Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were
partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including
/team/new) to 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update

caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id ==
caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who
originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget
fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access.

Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion

internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements
(PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper
to bring statement count under the limit.

test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local
"cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so
the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* bump: version 0.4.71 → 0.4.72

* uv lock

* feat(mcp): support OAuth passthrough discovery

* fix(mcp): support OAuth browser auth

* fix(mcp): refine upstream OAuth metadata fallback

* feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth

* fix(mcp): validate oauth callback redirect sink

* feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth

* test(mcp): align trusted proxy fixtures

* style(mcp): satisfy black formatting

* chore(ui): bump next to 16.2.6

* fix(mcp): address oauth passthrough review findings

* test(mcp): split oauth passthrough regressions

* fix(interactions): align openapi response fields

* security: prevent forwarding litellm api keys to upstream mcp servers

- Strip Authorization header from extra_headers for pass-through servers
- Pass-through servers (auth_type=None with extra_headers: [Authorization])
  must not receive the user's LiteLLM API key
- Only OAuth2 M2M and pass-through servers skip Authorization header
- Other headers (x-request-id, x-trace-id) are still forwarded normally
- Fixes credential leakage / authentication bypass in MCP pass-through mode

* fix(interactions): remove steps field not in google openapi spec

The steps field was added but is not present in the current Google
Interactions OpenAPI specification. Revert to using only the fields
that are actually defined in the spec.

* fix(mcp): forward Authorization in pass-through when x-litellm-api-key is admission

Commit 3753970cc9 widened the Authorization strip to cover all
is_oauth_passthrough servers — protecting against the LiteLLM admission
key leaking upstream when the caller used Authorization for admission,
but also silently stripping legitimate upstream OAuth bearers when the
caller used x-litellm-api-key for admission.

That broke transparent OAuth pass-through (EAI-506 V5/V6): standards-
compliant MCP clients (OpenCode, Claude Code, mcp-inspector) complete
PKCE against the upstream IdP and send the resulting token as plain
Authorization: Bearer per the MCP spec — with the wider strip in place,
that token never reaches the upstream and tools/list returns empty.

Narrow the strip: skip Authorization for pass-through servers only when
the caller did NOT supply x-litellm-api-key. When x-litellm-api-key is
present, admission is unambiguous and Authorization is free to carry
the upstream OAuth bearer.

The original security guarantee is preserved — a client that sends only
Authorization (no x-litellm-api-key) still has it stripped, so the
LiteLLM key cannot leak upstream via that path.

Tests:
- new: forwards Authorization when x-litellm-api-key is present
- new: still strips Authorization when only Authorization is present
- existing pass-through + M2M tests unchanged

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(interactions): align status enum with openapi spec

* fix(mcp,jwt): address greptile review concerns

- Cache _get_agent_object_permission via user_api_key_cache (sentinel for
  no-permission rows) so MCP requests from agent keys don't hit the DB on
  every tool-list / tool-call.
- Re-raise HTTPException in handle_sse_mcp so 401 + WWW-Authenticate
  challenges (and other HTTP errors) propagate to SSE clients instead of
  being swallowed as 500.
- Normalise booleans in _validate_token_response so admin rules written as
  JSON-style "true" / "false" match upstream responses that return
  Python True / False.
- Treat configured JWT issuer claim mappings as advisory: when a mapped
  field is absent or empty, leave the normalised claim unset instead of
  raising, matching the global litellm_jwtauth path.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: replace dall-e-3 with gpt-image-1 in health check and router tests (#27813)

OpenAI returns 'The model dall-e-3 does not exist' for the test account,
breaking test_openai_img_gen_health_check and test_image_generation.
Switch to gpt-image-1, matching the existing TestOpenAIGPTImage1 pattern.

(cherry picked from commit aee58db880)

* fix(tests): drop dall-e-only test classes; route live image tests via gpt-image-1

Second wave of failures from the 2026-05-12 DALL-E shutdown:
- tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_edits.py::TestOpenAIImageEditDallE2
  and tests/image_gen_tests/test_image_generation.py::TestOpenAIDalle3
  are explicitly named for the deprecated models and can't pass; remove.
  gpt-image-1 coverage already exists in sibling classes.
- tests/local_testing/test_router.py image gen tests use dall-e-3 only
  as a routing example; swap to gpt-image-1.
- tests/local_testing/test_custom_callback_input.py image_generation
  success/failure paths swapped to gpt-image-1.

(cherry picked from commit 945b10ded4)

* test(fireworks): replace deprecated llama-v3p3-70b-instruct model

Fireworks removed llama-v3p3-70b-instruct from serverless, so every
live test using it now fails with NotFoundError ("Model not found,
inaccessible, and/or not deployed").

Swap the 6 references (3 files) to the currently-served
accounts/fireworks/models/deepseek-v3p1 — the canonical model in
Fireworks' current docs examples and present in LiteLLM's cost map.
test_get_model_params_fireworks_ai is a pure pricing-heuristic test
(no network) asserting the >16b branch, so it uses llama-v3p1-70b-
instruct instead to keep the "fireworks-ai-above-16b" assertion and
branch coverage intact.

(cherry picked from commit 39a1d438f2)

* test(fireworks): mock remaining live smoke tests

test_completion_fireworks_ai and test_completion_cost_fireworks_ai
made real Fireworks calls and broke whenever Fireworks rotated its
serverless catalog (no externally-verifiable model list exists).
They also asserted nothing — just printed.

Mock the HTTP post and assert real behavior instead: the request is
built with the right model/messages and the OpenAI-compatible
response parses back; the cost path yields a non-zero cost against
the local cost map. No network, no model dependency, stronger than
the old smoke checks.

(cherry picked from commit b5db7ed37d)

* fix(tests): replace shut-down gpt-4o-audio-preview with gpt-audio-1.5 (#28281)

* fix(tests): replace shut-down gpt-4o-audio-preview with gpt-audio-1.5

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-audio-preview on 2026-05-07, so the live audio
calls in test_stream_chunk_builder_openai_audio_output_usage and
test_standard_logging_payload_audio now hard-fail with a model-not-found
error on every PR. The error was not "openai-internal", so the except
block swallowed it and execution fell through to an unbound
completion/response (UnboundLocalError).

Switch both tests to gpt-audio-1.5, OpenAI's recommended successor
(GA, not deprecated, already present in the litellm cost map so the
response_cost assertion still resolves). Also broaden the except to
skip with the real error in the reason instead of crashing, so a
transient upstream blip can't reintroduce the UnboundLocalError.

* fix(tests): narrow audio-test skip to model-not-found, re-raise the rest

Address review feedback: an unconditional skip on any exception would
silently mask a litellm-internal regression in the audio path (broken
param transformation, serialization, bad header) instead of failing CI.

Skip only on the upstream-unavailable class (model_not_found / "does not
exist" / openai-internal) and re-raise everything else, so genuine
regressions still fail loudly. The UnboundLocalError is still fixed
because the handler either skips or raises - it never falls through.

* fix(tests): add budget_exceeded to expected Interaction status enum

Staging added budget_exceeded to the Interaction OpenAPI status enum; the staging merge into this branch picked up the spec change but not the matching test update, so test_status_enum_values failed in CI. Align the test's expected list (exact-match by design) with the live spec.

* fix(tests): mock HTTP fetch in test_img_url_token_counter

The test parameterized a live third-party image URL (blog.purpureus.net) which now 404s, causing get_image_dimensions to fall through to its base64 decode path and crash with 'not enough values to unpack' on every PR run. Mock safe_get with a tiny 1x1 PNG so the URL branch is still exercised without any network dependency.

* fix(tests): swap gpt-4o-audio-preview to gpt-audio-1.5 in test_gpt4o_audio

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-audio-preview on 2026-05-07, so both live tests in test_gpt4o_audio.py (test_audio_output_from_model and test_audio_input_to_model) hard-fail model_not_found on every PR. Swap the hardcoded model to OpenAI's successor gpt-audio-1.5 (same chat-completions audio surface; already in the litellm cost map). Mirror the narrowed-skip pattern from the prior audio fixes: skip on model_not_found / does-not-exist / openai-internal, re-raise everything else so genuine litellm regressions still fail CI loudly.

(cherry picked from commit 92de7423ef)

* fix(tests): migrate realtime + rerank tests off shut-down upstream models (#28191)

* fix(tests): use gpt-realtime in realtime guardrails test

OpenAI shut down gpt-4o-realtime-preview-2024-12-17 on 2026-05-07, so
the live OpenAI realtime guardrails integration test now fails with
model_not_found (session.created never arrives, _wait_for_event times
out). Point OPENAI_REALTIME_URL at the current GA model, gpt-realtime.

Scope limited to this test: the pricing-catalog JSON keeps the retired
entries intentionally (historical cost calc + separate Azure timeline),
and the Azure realtime cost-calc test is unaffected.

* fix(tests): mock nvidia_nim rerank instead of hitting EOL'd endpoint

NVIDIA reached end-of-life for the hosted nvidia/llama-3.2-nv-rerankqa-1b-v2
rerank API on 2026-05-18 with no published replacement, so the live
BaseLLMRerankTest.test_basic_rerank for nvidia_nim now returns HTTP 410
("Gone"). NVIDIA's hosted catalog rotates on a schedule, so swapping in
another live model would only defer the failure.

Override test_basic_rerank in TestNvidiaNim to mock the sync/async HTTP
transport (same pattern as test_nvidia_nim_rerank_ranking_endpoint in this
file) and inject a fake NVIDIA_NIM_API_KEY via monkeypatch. The
request/response transformation and cost calculation stay covered offline.
Scope limited to nvidia_nim; other BaseLLMRerankTest providers untouched.

* fix(tests): migrate remaining realtime tests off shut-down gpt-4o-realtime-preview

OpenAI's 2026-05-07 shutdown removed the entire gpt-4o-realtime-preview
family, including the undated 'gpt-4o-realtime-preview' alias (not just the
dated snapshot fixed earlier). Three live tests still connected with the
dead alias and failed with messages_received=1 (an error event instead of
session.created):

- test_openai_realtime_simple.py: get_model() -> gpt-realtime (drives
  TestOpenAIRealtime.test_realtime_connection / test_realtime_with_query_params)
- test_openai_realtime.py: test_openai_realtime_direct_call_no_intent and
  test_openai_realtime_direct_call_with_intent -> openai/gpt-realtime
  (the with_intent test shares the same dead alias even though it was not
  in the failing set this run)

Mocked unit tests (test_realtime_query_params_construction,
test_realtime_query_params_use_normalized_model_name) are left as-is: they
never hit the network and assert string plumbing only.

Also fixes test_text_message_blocked_by_guardrail_no_ai_response, which now
connects (the earlier URL swap worked) but tripped a model-wording-brittle
assertion. The guardrail flow asks the model to voice the block message
verbatim; gpt-4o-realtime-preview complied (output contained 'blocked'),
gpt-realtime refuses verbatim-repeat instructions ('I'm sorry, but I can't
repeat that message.'). Since the original user message is blocked before
it reaches OpenAI, the refusal is still a safe outcome. Assertion #3 now
accepts both voicing and refusal, and adds a hard check that the blocked
phrase never leaks into AI output.

(cherry picked from commit ce87c411bf)

* fix(model_prices): register mistral/ministral-8b-2512

Mistral's API now returns model='ministral-8b-2512' when 'mistral-tiny'
is requested, so test_completion_mistral_api fails with 'This model
isn't mapped yet'. Adding the entry so completion_cost can resolve the
cost for that response.

Author: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp,auth): address greptile review concerns

- handle_sse_mcp now calls _raise_preemptive_401_for_unauthenticated_servers
  so SSE clients to pass-through OAuth MCP servers receive the RFC 9728
  401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge that the streamable-HTTP path already emits.
- get_request_route strips a trailing slash from root_path before length-based
  prefix removal so non-canonical ASGI root_path values like "/litellm/"
  don't strip the leading slash from the returned route.
- _mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth's cookie JWT decode now passes
  options={"verify_aud": False} so a future revision of the UI session
  JWT containing an aud claim cannot silently downgrade the request to
  unauthenticated.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): backfill local model_cost into remote-fetched map

litellm.model_cost is loaded at import time from LITELLM_MODEL_COST_MAP_URL
(pinned to main), so pricing entries that exist only in this branch (e.g.
mistral/ministral-8b-2512, freshly added because Mistral's API now returns
this id from mistral-tiny) are absent at test time and completion_cost
lookups raise 'This model isn't mapped yet'. Backfill the in-tree backup
into litellm.model_cost in the local_testing conftest so cassette-driven
cost calculations resolve against the entries that ship with the branch
under test.

Fixes local_testing_part1 failures on test_completion_mistral_api and
test_completion_mistral_api_modified_input.

* fix(mcp,jwt): address greptile concurrency and code-quality concerns

- _apply_issuer_claim_mappings now builds a new dict and reads from the
  original token, rather than mutating its input. The change is
  behaviour-preserving (caller passes a fresh jwt.decode result), but
  avoids the surprise-mutation pattern flagged by greptile.
- is_network_error uses isinstance(exc, httpx.TransportError) instead of
  matching type(exc).__name__ against a hand-maintained string set, so
  ReadError / WriteError / ProxyError / etc. are also treated as
  transport-level failures and surfaced as HTTP 502.
- fetch_upstream_oauth_protected_resource now coalesces concurrent
  discovery requests per (server_id, resource_url) through an
  asyncio.Lock so concurrent .well-known calls share a single upstream
  fetch + cache write.
- Drop the redundant 'if trusted_ranges:' branch in get_mcp_client_ip;
  it is always true on the path that reaches it (the prior 'if not
  trusted_ranges:' early-returns).

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(jwt,mcp): fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer; prune fetch locks

- handle_jwt._get_configured_issuer now returns None for tokens whose 'iss'
  is not in the configured issuers list, letting auth_jwt fall through to
  the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path instead of hard-raising. This keeps
  existing tokens from non-configured IdPs working when an operator adds
  the new 'issuers' list to a live deployment.

- discoverable_endpoints._prune_oauth_metadata_cache now also prunes
  entries in _OAUTH_METADATA_FETCH_LOCKS whose cache entry has been
  evicted and whose lock isn't currently held, bounding the locks dict
  to match the cache it guards.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp,auth): restore client_ip in oauth2 target check, drop from delegate check

The merge of staging into the PR branch (d42a66adb6) misplaced the
client_ip=client_ip kwarg: it landed inside _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
(which never accepted client_ip and isn't called with it), while the
sibling _target_servers_use_oauth2 has client_ip in its signature but
stopped passing it through to get_mcp_server_by_name. That left ruff
flagging F821 on the undefined name and lint failing.

Move client_ip back into _target_servers_use_oauth2's lookup (matching
the call site that already forwards IPAddressUtils.get_mcp_client_ip)
and drop it from _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream so its body
matches its signature again.

* fix(mcp): respect client ip for delegated auth

* fix(auth): address remaining greptile style findings

- get_request_route: require root_path to match whole path segments before
  stripping, so '/apifoo' isn't truncated to 'foo' when root_path='/api'.
- get_mcp_client_ip: collapse the two trusted-proxy validation branches into
  a single is_request_from_trusted_proxy call so the return value drives
  control flow instead of being discarded for the side-effect warning.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(jwt): strip internal _litellm_* claims in global JWKS auth path

Prevents identity spoofing where a token signed by the global JWKS
could inject _litellm_jwt_issuer and other _litellm_* claims that
downstream getters trust. The issuer-scoped path already strips these
via _apply_issuer_claim_mappings; mirror that behavior for the global
fallback path.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): surface MCPUpstreamAuthError as 401 in SSE/HTTP transport handlers

Both handle_sse_mcp and handle_streamable_http_mcp only caught
HTTPException to preserve 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenges, but
MCPUpstreamAuthError (raised when a pass-through server's upstream
rejects a bearer token mid-session) inherits from Exception. It was
falling through to the generic handler and surfacing as an opaque 500.

Mirror the REST endpoint behavior: translate MCPUpstreamAuthError into
an HTTPException(status_code=e.status_code) with the upstream
www-authenticate header so standards-compliant MCP clients trigger the
upstream OAuth flow.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): add upstream auth pre-flight in SSE handler

Mirror handle_streamable_http_mcp by calling _check_passthrough_upstream_auth
after the cold-start 401 emitter so expired/invalid upstream tokens surface a
proper 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge before the SSE session commits 200
headers, instead of letting list_tools silently return [] when the upstream
rejects the token.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): tighten cold-start bypass against CSV paths + dedupe upstream auth probe

- Return None from _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path for CSV multi-server
  paths (/mcp/a,b). The regex previously truncated at the first comma and
  silently passed a single server name to the cold-start gate.
- Switch _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start to all-targets semantics, matching
  _target_servers_use_oauth2: one non-passthrough target in a co-targeted
  set must not flip the anonymous-admission bypass open for the others.
- Drop the redundant HTTPStatusError block in _extract_upstream_auth_failure
  - any HTTPStatusError carries a .response, so the preceding generic block
  already handles 401/403 detection.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp,tests): sync stubs and cold-start assertions with delegate-check

The merge of base-branch _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
into process_mcp_request inserts an additional
get_mcp_server_by_name(name) lookup ahead of the cold-start path,
which breaks two test patterns:

1. lookup_by_name(name) side-effect stubs in
   TestMCPDelegateAuthToUpstream are called positionally by the
   delegate check, then again by the cold-start path with
   client_ip=... — raising TypeError: unexpected keyword argument
   'client_ip'. Accept **_kwargs to match the real signature.

2. TestMCPPassthroughColdStartAdmission assertions count the lookup
   exactly once with client_ip=..., but the delegate check now adds
   a positional-only call ahead of it. Switch assert_called_once_with
   to assert_any_call for the cold-start invocation, and assert
   client_ip was *not* passed for the aggregate /mcp test where
   cold-start must not fire.

Both updates align with CLAUDE.md guidance to keep monkeypatch stubs in
sync with the real signature when an optional parameter is added.

Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): correct passthrough probe 401 + slashed-name cold start parser

- _check_passthrough_upstream_auth now emits
  'Bearer resource_metadata="..."' pointing at the gateway's
  oauth-protected-resource well-known URL, mirroring the
  pre-emptive 401 path. Pass-through servers don't use the gateway
  as an authorization server, so the previous 'authorization_uri='
  challenge sent clients to the wrong metadata endpoint.

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now accepts server names that
  contain a single slash (e.g. custom_solutions/user_123), mirroring
  MCPRequestHandler._extract_target_server_names_from_path. Without
  this, the cold-start bypass missed slashed-name servers and the
  generic admission error propagated instead of the spec-compliant
  401 challenge.

- _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start drops the unused scope parameter
  from its signature.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* style(mcp): format discoverable endpoints

* refactor(mcp): dedupe MCPUpstreamAuthError->HTTPException + thread client_ip into delegate-auth gate

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): handle passthrough OAuth metadata and startup auth errors

- discoverable_endpoints: For pass-through MCP servers, when upstream
  oauth-protected-resource returns a non-200/non-dict response, raise
  HTTP 502 instead of falling through to default gateway metadata.
  Falling through would direct MCP clients at the gateway, which is
  not the authorization server for pass-through configs.

- mcp_server_manager: Wrap _get_tools_from_server in startup tool name
  mapping with try/except. Since _get_tools_from_server now re-raises
  MCPUpstreamAuthError, an upstream 401 from a pass-through server at
  startup (when no user token is present) would otherwise abort the
  loop and leave subsequent servers unmapped.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): restrict passthrough probe challenge to OAuth passthrough servers

The probe filter previously matched any server with Authorization in
extra_headers, including gateway-managed OAuth2 servers. Those would
then receive the resource_metadata= WWW-Authenticate challenge meant
for pass-through servers, instead of the authorization_uri= challenge
pointing at the gateway AS metadata. Use srv.is_oauth_passthrough so
only genuine pass-through servers get the resource-metadata challenge.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* test(proxy): cover issuer-scoped JWT auth

* fix(mcp): use resource metadata for passthrough reauth

* fix(mcp,tests): assert cold-start helper directly for aggregate /mcp

Threading client_ip into _target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream
made get_mcp_server_by_name(name, client_ip=...) also fire from the
delegate-auth check, so the call_args_list assertion on
client_ip-in-kwargs no longer uniquely signals a cold-start lookup.
Patch _is_mcp_passthrough_cold_start and assert it is not invoked,
which is the actual contract the test is pinning.

* fix(mcp,jwt): drop unneeded async helper + suppress misleading unscoped JWT warning

- _build_oauth_authorization_server_response: revert to sync (no awaits in body).
  The function only does dict construction and synchronous registry lookups;
  async added coroutine creation overhead per discovery call without need.
- _build_decode_kwargs: accept has_issuer_config so the global path's
  'JWT auth is unscoped' warning is suppressed when LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers
  provides per-issuer scoping. Previously the warning fired spuriously for
  admins who intentionally use only the new issuers config.

* fix(jwt,mcp): clarify issuers fallthrough + add TTL on mcp permission cache

- LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers docs now state explicitly that unlisted
  issuers fall back to the global JWT_AUDIENCE/JWT_ISSUER path; the
  field is additive routing, not an allow-list. Matches actual
  control flow in handle_jwt.auth_jwt and the regression tests
  asserting backwards compatibility with the global JWKS path.
- MCPRequestHandler._get_{org,agent}_object_permission now pass
  ttl=DEFAULT_MANAGEMENT_OBJECT_IN_MEMORY_CACHE_TTL on async_set_cache,
  mirroring the auth_checks.py pattern so the cache TTL is explicit
  on both DualCache layers.

* fix(tests): align merged JWT and MCP cold-start assertions

Update the tests carried over from PR #28008 to match the assertions on
the staging branch:

- tests/test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_handle_jwt.py: unknown issuers now
  fall back to the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path (per
  litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth's
  '\''fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer'\''), and mapped issuer
  claims that are absent no longer fail closed — they simply leave the
  normalised LiteLLM internal claim absent.

- tests/test_litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/auth/test_user_api_key_auth_mcp.py:
  the aggregate '\''/mcp'\'' route still triggers the delegate-auth-to-upstream
  lookup once for the header-supplied server name; cold-start admission
  must NOT fire on top of that. Tighten the assertion to
  assert_called_once_with so a future regression that re-enters cold-start
  is caught.

Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(jwt): guard litellm_jwtauth access in auth_jwt global path

JWTHandler() can be constructed without update_environment() being
called (tests do this directly), in which case self.litellm_jwtauth
does not exist. Accessing it raises AttributeError before getattr can
fall back. Use the same safe pattern other call sites use.

* Gate MCP OAuth pass-through on delegate_auth_to_upstream flag

Sameer's review on #28356/#28008 flagged that the new pass-through
behaviors (preemptive 401 challenges, /.well-known/oauth-protected-
resource proxying, upstream 401/403 propagation as MCPUpstreamAuthError,
and Authorization-stripping when no x-litellm-api-key is supplied)
were implicitly enabled for every server with auth_type=none plus
Authorization in extra_headers. Existing users doing static bearer
pass-through for non-OAuth reasons would have silently regressed.

Make the detection rule explicit: extend the existing
delegate_auth_to_upstream flag (previously oauth2-only) to also gate
is_oauth_passthrough. Now requires flag + auth_type=None + Authorization
in extra_headers, per Sameer's suggested detection rule. The UI toggle
now appears for both modes (oauth2 PKCE passthrough and auth_type=none
OAuth pass-through) with mode-appropriate copy.

Update test fixtures to set the flag where the test intent is to
exercise OAuth pass-through behavior, and add negative tests covering
the new default-false case.

* fix(mcp): route org object_permission lookup through shared auth helpers

Replace the bespoke litellm_organizationtable.find_unique + dedicated
cache key in _get_org_object_permission with get_org_object +
get_object_permission so MCP requests share the same user_api_key_cache
entries as the rest of the proxy and no longer fragment org-row caching.

* fix(mcp): wrap get_object_permission call in shared try/except

Ensure exceptions from get_object_permission in _get_org_object_permission are caught and return None, preserving the original fail-safe semantics.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt): validate issuer audience at config load + dedicated key-miss exception

- Move JWTIssuerConfig audience-required guard into a Pydantic model_validator
  so misconfiguration fails at startup instead of on the first request.
- Replace the string-match `No matching public key found` filter in
  get_public_key's multi-URL fallback with a dedicated
  NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError; only that specific exception triggers
  continuation, every other error still surfaces.

* fix(mcp): admit and forward Authorization for passthrough OAuth return

For pass-through MCP servers (auth_type=none with delegate_auth_to_upstream)
the RFC 9728 cold-start flow sends the client back with only
"Authorization: Bearer <upstream-token>" after upstream OAuth discovery.
Previously this path 1) was rejected in process_mcp_request because the
oauth2_headers fallback only covered auth_type=oauth2 targets, and 2) had
the Authorization header stripped by _prepare_mcp_server_headers when no
x-litellm-api-key was present, treating the upstream token as a potential
LiteLLM key leak.

- Extend the elif oauth2_headers fallback to also admit anonymously when
  every target is a pass-through server.
- Pass user_api_key_auth into _prepare_mcp_server_headers so it can
  forward Authorization for pass-through servers when admission did not
  consume the bearer as a LiteLLM key (api_key is unset).

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): consistent www-authenticate casing + SSE toolset scoping

- Normalize the WWW-Authenticate header key emitted by
  _check_passthrough_upstream_auth to lowercase to match the other 401
  emitters in the OAuth pass-through flow.
- Mirror the streamable HTTP handler's toolset scoping in handle_sse_mcp:
  strip client-supplied x-mcp-toolset-id and apply _apply_toolset_scope
  before _check_passthrough_upstream_auth so the upstream probe list is
  derived from the fully-authorized server set.
- Tighten _has_client_supplied_mcp_auth signature so
  mcp_server_auth_headers is Optional, matching its caller in
  process_mcp_request.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* security(mcp): strip Authorization in call_tool when LiteLLM admission used legacy header

Mirror the OAuth pass-through admission check from _prepare_mcp_server_headers
(list-tools path) in _call_regular_mcp_tool (tool-call path): when the server
is OAuth pass-through and the caller did not supply x-litellm-api-key,
Authorization on the inbound request may itself be the LiteLLM API key — so
strip it before forwarding instead of leaking the gateway credential upstream.

When x-litellm-api-key is present, admission is unambiguous and Authorization
continues to carry the upstream OAuth bearer (transparent pass-through).

* refactor(mcp): centralize caller Authorization strip decision

Extracted the security-sensitive logic that decides whether the caller's
Authorization header is forwarded to (or stripped from) an outgoing MCP
request into a single helper, _should_strip_caller_authorization, in
mcp_server_manager.py.

Previously the same condition was duplicated across
_call_regular_mcp_tool (mcp_server_manager.py) and
_prepare_mcp_server_headers (server.py). Keeping two copies of this
check risked future divergence and credential-leak / broken-passthrough
bugs. Both call sites now share the helper, preserving exact behavior.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* log MCP OAuth discovery diagnostics for unmatched paths and non-transport upstream errors

* fix(jwt): include issuer-normalized team id in get_all_jwt_team_ids

The aggregator for team IDs only consulted the issuer-normalized claim
for the plural (team_ids) path and fell back to the global config for
the singular path. When an operator configures team_id_jwt_field only
at the issuer level, get_team_id correctly returned the mapped value
but get_all_jwt_team_ids silently dropped it, causing membership
reconciliation to disagree with request routing.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp/jwt): dedupe cold-start path parser; reject conflicting audience flags

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now delegates to
  MCPRequestHandler._extract_target_server_names_from_path so the
  names used by the cold-start passthrough bypass cannot drift from the
  names used by downstream routing.
- JWTIssuerConfig now rejects the combination of audience and
  disable_audience_validation=True at validation time instead of
  silently ignoring the flag.

* fix(mcp): restrict passthrough cold-start bypass to 401 only

The new elif passthrough cold-start branch reused is_auth_error which
matches both 401 and 403. A 403 from user_api_key_auth indicates the
LiteLLM key WAS recognized but is forbidden (e.g. over budget / rate
limited); falling through to anonymous UserAPIKeyAuth() in that case
bypasses spend and rate-limit controls on passthrough servers.

Only trigger the cold-start anonymous admission on 401, which is the
signal that the bearer is an upstream OAuth token rather than a
recognized LiteLLM key.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt/mcp): warn on unscoped JWT fallback; route agent permission lookup through shared helper

- _build_decode_kwargs no longer suppresses the unscoped-fallback warning
  when LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers is set: tokens whose iss does not match
  any configured issuer still fall through to the global path, and that
  fallback is itself unscoped when JWT_AUDIENCE/JWT_ISSUER are absent.

- _get_agent_object_permission now caches the agent_id ->
  object_permission_id mapping and delegates the permission lookup to
  the shared get_object_permission helper, so the agent path reuses the
  same cache entries as the org / team / key paths.

* fix(mcp): fabricate resource_metadata challenge when upstream 401 omits WWW-Authenticate

When an upstream pass-through MCP server returns 401 without a
WWW-Authenticate header (non-compliant per RFC 7235 §3.1),
to_http_exception() now produces a synthetic Bearer challenge pointing
at the gateway's standard-pattern oauth-protected-resource well-known
endpoint for that server. This keeps MCP clients on the RFC 9728
discovery flow instead of receiving a bare 401 with no recovery hint.

* fix(jwt): make _get_decode_options explicitly control verify_iss

Previously, _get_decode_options only set verify_aud based on whether
audience was provided. The issuer JWT path relied on always passing
issuer=issuer_config.issuer to trigger PyJWT's default verify_iss=True,
making the helper's behavior implicitly dependent on caller behavior.

Now _get_decode_options accepts issuer as well, mirroring the verify_aud
handling and matching the dimensions handled by _build_decode_kwargs.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): emit absolute resource_metadata URI in fabricated 401 challenge

Per RFC 9728 §3.2 the resource_metadata Bearer challenge must be an
absolute URI; strict MCP clients reject relative URIs and fail to
initiate discovery. MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception now accepts
the gateway base URL and prepends it when the upstream omitted
WWW-Authenticate, and all four call sites (streamable HTTP, SSE, and
the two REST tool-list paths) supply it.

* fix(mcp): correct 403 detail text and remove dead _list_tools_for_single_server duplicate

- MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception() now returns detail='Forbidden' for
  403 upstream responses (and 'Unauthorized' for 401), matching the
  _check_passthrough_upstream_auth pre-flight probe.
- Remove the shadowed first definition of _list_tools_for_single_server in
  rest_endpoints.py; the second definition was the live one and the dead copy
  was a maintenance trap.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix: address potential bugs in auth_utils, mcp discoverable endpoints, and mcp auth

- auth_utils.get_request_route: return '/' instead of empty string when
  raw_path exactly equals root_path so downstream route allowlist checks
  still see a leading slash
- discoverable_endpoints.fetch_upstream_oauth_protected_resource: also
  cache negative results (no upstream metadata) for a shorter TTL so we
  don't re-fetch on every discovery request and so the per-key fetch
  lock can be pruned
- user_api_key_auth_mcp: guard the oauth2_headers 401 cold-start
  passthrough bypass with _has_client_supplied_mcp_auth, matching the
  parallel bypass in the no-Authorization branch so MCP-auth-bearing
  requests don't silently downgrade to anonymous admission

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* test(vertex): tolerate transient InternalServerError in google maps tool test

test_gemini_google_maps_tool_simple makes live calls to Vertex AI's Google
Maps grounding backend, which intermittently returns 500 INTERNAL ("Please
retry") — a transient upstream failure, not a LiteLLM bug. The test already
passes on RateLimitError; treat InternalServerError the same way so transient
Vertex-side failures don't fail CI.

* refactor(mcp): drop redundant has_client_credentials filter on passthrough probe

is_oauth_passthrough already requires auth_type in (None, MCPAuth.none),
which is mutually exclusive with has_client_credentials (auth_type ==
MCPAuth.oauth2), so the extra guard was always True and only added
confusion about whether a server could be both passthrough and M2M.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix: restore unreachable InternalServerError skip handler in vertex test

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* feat(mcp): add dedicated oauth_passthrough flag for non-oauth2 pass-through

Previously is_oauth_passthrough reused delegate_auth_to_upstream — a flag
scoped to oauth2 servers (PKCE bypass) — to gate OAuth pass-through for
auth_type=none servers. Overloading it risked regressing existing
deployments that set delegate_auth_to_upstream, since the same flag would
silently start driving pass-through (discovery proxying, 401 challenges,
upstream 401/403 propagation) on non-oauth2 servers.

Introduce a separate oauth_passthrough opt-in so the two behaviors never
imply each other:
- MCPServer.is_oauth_passthrough now requires oauth_passthrough (not
  delegate_auth_to_upstream).
- Persist oauth_passthrough on LiteLLM_MCPServerTable (new column +
  migration) and wire it through config/DB load and API responses.
- UI splits the single toggle into two: "Delegate auth to upstream (PKCE
  passthrough)" for oauth2 and "OAuth pass-through" for auth_type=none
  servers forwarding Authorization.

Adds backend tests (property, round-trip, and a regression guard that
delegate_auth_to_upstream alone never enables pass-through) and UI tests
for the toggle split.

* fix(mcp): reconcile cold-start bypass with x-mcp-servers header and skip non-absolute WWW-Authenticate fabrication

- _parse_mcp_server_names_from_path now fails closed when the
  x-mcp-servers header introduces any target not present in the
  path-derived target set, closing a header/path mismatch where the
  cold-start passthrough bypass could otherwise admit anonymously
  while the header advertises a non-passthrough server.
- MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception no longer emits a relative
  resource_metadata URI when base_url is missing; per RFC 9728 3.2
  the URI must be absolute, so we skip fabrication entirely rather
  than send a challenge strict MCP clients will reject.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): fabricate path-aware resource_metadata URI for upstream 401

When MCPUpstreamAuthError.to_http_exception fabricates a
`WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=...` challenge (because
the upstream 401 omitted one), the URL now matches the inbound MCP
transport pattern the client originally used:

  - /mcp/{server_name}      -> /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp/{server_name}
  - /{server_name}/mcp      -> /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/{server_name}/mcp

This mirrors the path-aware behaviour of
_get_passthrough_resource_metadata_url in server.py so strict
RFC 9728 \xA73.2 clients on legacy routes get a resource_metadata URI
aligned with the resource pattern they originally targeted.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(jwt+mcp): tighten issuer-scoped claim type handling, RFC-quote authorization_uri, surface MCP upstream auth errors, defense-in-depth on decode options

- handle_jwt: when an issuer-scoped _litellm_team_ids claim exists but
  has an unexpected type, return [] instead of falling through to the
  global team_ids_jwt_field path (different claim semantically).
- handle_jwt: _get_decode_options/_decode_jwt_with_public_key now take
  an explicit disable_audience_validation flag; passing audience=None
  without it raises, so audience checks can't silently disappear if the
  model validator is ever bypassed. _auth_jwt_with_issuer forwards the
  flag from JWTIssuerConfig.
- mcp_server: quote the authorization_uri WWW-Authenticate parameter
  value (RFC 6750 / 9728 auth-param must be quoted-string), matching
  the pass-through path.
- mcp_server: in _fetch_and_filter_server_tools, re-raise
  MCPUpstreamAuthError so the outer streamable-HTTP handler can surface
  a proper 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenge instead of returning an
  empty tool list.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* chore(docker): align Dockerfile.non_root/Dockerfile.database to current wolfi-base SHA

The older sha256:3258be... pin has been intermittently returning 500/not-found
from cgr.dev, breaking the test-server-root-path GitHub Action and the
build_docker_database_image CircleCI job. Move both Dockerfiles onto the
same sha256:31da65... digest already in use by Dockerfile, gateway/Dockerfile,
backend/Dockerfile, and migrations/Dockerfile so the base image is consistent
across the repo.

* ci(docker): bump wolfi-base pin to current working digest

The previously aligned sha256:31da6565f35a... and the older sha256:3258be...
both return HTTP 500 from cgr.dev's manifest endpoint, breaking the
build_docker_database_image CircleCI job and test-server-root-path GitHub
Action. The current 'latest' tag resolves to sha256:5743937d521c... which
serves manifests normally, so move docker/Dockerfile.database and
docker/Dockerfile.non_root onto that digest.

* ci(docker): retry apk add in Dockerfile.database for apk.cgr.dev flakes

Mirror the retry-loop pattern from #28888 (which fixed backend/Dockerfile,
gateway/Dockerfile, and migrations/Dockerfile) into docker/Dockerfile.database.
The build_docker_database_image CI job has been intermittently failing with
"remote server returned error (try 'apk update')" when apk.cgr.dev flakes
mid-fetch; bumping the wolfi-base SHA doesn't address the mirror, only a
retry does.

Same explicit-failure form as #28888: exit non-zero on the 3rd miss instead
of silently succeeding because `sleep 5` was the last command in the
`&& break || sleep 5` chain.

* fix(mcp): scope preemptive 401 to toolset-narrowed server set

Move _raise_preemptive_401_for_unauthenticated_servers after toolset
scoping in both the StreamableHTTP and SSE handlers, and add an
optional allowed_server_ids parameter so passthrough/oauth2 servers
that the active toolset excludes no longer trigger a spurious 401
challenge. Without this, a client targeting a toolset whose scope
excludes a passthrough server could be pushed into an OAuth flow for
a server it would be 403'd on immediately after authentication.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* revert(docker): drop unrelated Wolfi bump and apk retry loop from MCP/JWT PR

These Docker changes are out of scope for the MCP OAuth passthrough + JWT
auth work and duplicate the build-reliability fix already merged to
litellm_internal_staging in #28888, which adds the same apk retry loop on
the componentized backend/gateway/migrations Dockerfiles and also fixes the
underlying nodeenv/libatomic root cause. Restoring docker/Dockerfile.database
and docker/Dockerfile.non_root to the base so this PR is purely the MCP/JWT
change.

* fix(mcp): surface upstream 403 challenges from REST tools/list

The single-server pass-through path converted an upstream MCPUpstreamAuthError
into an HTTPException, but list_tool_rest_api only re-raised 401s; an upstream
403 (valid token, insufficient scope) collapsed into a 200 response with
error=unexpected_error, so clients never saw the status or WWW-Authenticate
challenge needed to refresh scopes. Let MCPUpstreamAuthError propagate and
convert it once in list_tool_rest_api so both 401 and 403 reach the client,
while internal access/IP 403s keep the legacy error-dict shape.

* fix(mcp): fail closed for IP access control when XFF trusted ranges unset

When use_x_forwarded_for is enabled but mcp_trusted_proxy_ranges is not
configured, get_mcp_client_ip previously fell back to the direct peer IP.
Behind an internal reverse proxy that peer is the proxy's private address,
so every external caller was classified as internal and could reach MCP
servers with available_on_public_internet=false. Return an empty string in
that case so is_internal_ip treats the caller as external.

---------

Co-authored-by: Yuneng Jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Milan <milan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish+github@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: gym-cmd <186399764+gym-cmd@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Artem Dudarev <artem.dudarev@justeattakeaway.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
2026-06-02 12:22:04 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
1480ec698b
chore(ci): bump versions (#28287)
* bump: version 0.4.72 → 0.4.73

* bump: version 1.86.0 → 1.87.0

* uv lock
2026-05-19 15:10:37 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
36c494fdd2
Litellm oss staging (#28161)
* fix(opentelemetry): JSON-serialize dict metadata fields for OTEL span attributes (#27451) (#27455)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from Anai-Guo's PR.

* feat(dashscope): add embeddings and reranks(qwen3-rerank) support via OpenAI-compatible endpoint (#27508)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from yimao's PR.

* fix(vertex_ai/gemini): raise BadRequestError when image_url or url fi… (#24550)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from krisxia0506's PR.

* fix(vertex_ai): raise error on mid-stream 429/error chunks instead of silently swallowing (#23711)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from krisxia0506's PR.

* fix: raise BadRequestError for file content blocks missing 'file' sub… (#24503)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from krisxia0506's PR.

* Fix Gemini MIME detection for extensionless GCS URIs (#27278)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from krisxia0506's PR.

* fix(vertex_ai/partner_models): drop unused vertexai SDK gate from count_tokens (closes #28084) (#28107)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from voidborne-d's PR.

* feat(chart): add support for autoscaling behavior in HPA (#27990)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from FabrizioCafolla's PR.

* feat(proxy): add blocked flag to models for pause/resume from the UI (#27927)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from Cyberfilo's PR.

* fix: pass socket timeouts to Redis cluster clients (#27920)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from tomdee's PR.

* Fix/cache token (#28009)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from escon1004's PR.

* fix(deepseek): forward reasoning_content in multi-turn thinking mode conversations (#28080)

Squash-merged by litellm-agent from Divyansh8321's PR.

* fix(guardrails): return HTTP 400 instead of 500 for blocked requests (#27617)

* fix: reset org and tag budgets (#27326)

* reset org budgets

* reset tag budgets

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Riad Zaky <michaelr@Mac.localdomain>

* fix(ui): omit allowed_routes from key edit save when unchanged (#27553)

* fix(ui): omit allowed_routes from key edit save when unchanged

When a team admin opens Edit Settings on a key with key_type=AI APIs and
saves without changing anything, the UI re-sends the existing allowed_routes
value, which the backend's _check_allowed_routes_caller_permission gate
rejects for non-proxy-admins (LIT-2681).

Strip allowed_routes from the patch in handleSubmit when it deep-equals the
original keyData.allowed_routes. The backend treats absence as "leave alone,"
so no-op saves now succeed for non-admins. Admins explicitly editing the
field still send the new value.

* fix(ui): order-insensitive allowed_routes diff + cover null-original case

Address Greptile review:

- Switch the "is allowed_routes unchanged" check to a Set-based comparison so
  a server-side reorder of the array doesn't register as a user edit and
  re-trigger LIT-2681.
- Add two regression tests: (1) keyData.allowed_routes is null and the form
  is untouched — patch should strip the field; (2) server returned routes in
  a different order than the user originally entered — patch should still
  recognize the value as unchanged.

* chore(ui): strip ticket refs and tighten comments in key edit fix

- Remove internal-tracker references from in-code comments
- Tighten the WHY comment in handleSubmit to two lines
- Drop redundant test-block comments — test names already describe the case

* fix(ui): annotate Set<string> generic in allowed_routes diff to fix tsc

* fix(guardrails): return HTTP 400 instead of 500 for guardrail-blocked requests

GuardrailRaisedException and BlockedPiiEntityError both lacked a
status_code attribute.  When these exceptions reached the proxy
exception handler (getattr(e, 'status_code', 500)), the fallback
defaulted to HTTP 500 — making intentional guardrail blocks
indistinguishable from server errors and causing unnecessary client
retries.

Changes:
- Add status_code=400 (keyword-only) to GuardrailRaisedException
- Add status_code=400 (keyword-only) to BlockedPiiEntityError
- Update _is_guardrail_intervention() to recognize both exceptions
  so downstream loggers record 'guardrail_intervened' instead of
  'guardrail_failed_to_respond'
- Add 6 unit tests for default/custom status codes and getattr pattern
- Strengthen existing blocked-action test with status_code assertion

Fixes #24348

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael-RZ-Berri <michael@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Michael Riad Zaky <michaelr@Mac.localdomain>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish+github@berri.ai>

* fix(router/proxy): address Greptile P1+P2 review comments on PR #28161

- router: raise ServiceUnavailableError (503) instead of RouterRateLimitErrorBasic (429)
  when a specifically-addressed deployment is administratively blocked; 429 misleads
  retry-enabled clients into spinning forever against a paused model
- proxy_server: compute get_fully_blocked_model_names() once before both branches in
  model_list() instead of duplicating the call in each branch
- deepseek: upgrade silent debug log to warning when injecting placeholder
  reasoning_content so callers are clearly notified of degraded multi-turn quality
- tests: update two blocked-deployment assertions to expect ServiceUnavailableError

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix: address bug detection findings (cache token order, mutable defaults)

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix: address bugs in async pass-through, anthropic cache token detection, rerank tests

- async_get_available_deployment_for_pass_through: enforce blocked check on specific deployments
- cost_calculator: detect anthropic-style usage by attribute presence (not truthiness) to avoid mixing OpenAI cached_tokens into anthropic normalization when read=0
- dashscope rerank tests: pass request to httpx.Response constructions for consistency

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix code qa

* fix(vertex_ai/gemini): strip MIME parameters from GCS contentType

GCS object metadata's contentType field can include parameters such as
'text/html; charset=utf-8'. Strip them in _apply_gemini_mime_type_aliases
so downstream get_file_extension_from_mime_type sees a bare MIME type.

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(vertex_ai/gemini): clarify mime-type error message string concatenation

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Tai An <antai12232931@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Vincent <yimao1231@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kris Xia <xiajiayi0506@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: d 🔹 <liusway405@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Fabrizio Cafolla <developer@fabriziocafolla.com>
Co-authored-by: Filippo Menghi <113345637+Cyberfilo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Tom Denham <tom@tomdee.co.uk>
Co-authored-by: escon1004 <70471150+escon1004@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Divyansh Singhal <97736786+Divyansh8321@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: robin-fiddler <robin@fiddler.ai>
Co-authored-by: Michael-RZ-Berri <michael@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Michael Riad Zaky <michaelr@Mac.localdomain>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish+github@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
2026-05-18 16:27:44 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
0aa439d919
bump: version 0.4.71 → 0.4.72 2026-05-13 21:51:11 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
8bbc61e03c
fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route

Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed
Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as
`http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/"
is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable
without authentication.

Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line,
not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path
deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"],
mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic.

Affected variants confirmed fixed:
  Host: localhost/?x=1
  Host: localhost:4000/?x=1
  Host: localhost/#test
  Host: localhost:4000/#test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: reduce comments in route fix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options

Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.)
in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with
a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side.

Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict
with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an
arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an
attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials
refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users

Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could
update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. —
without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation.

Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own
key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless
of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options

A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server
to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an
attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF.

Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and
the existing credential fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check

Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config
(aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have
the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.

- Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles)
- Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins
- Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request

Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass
aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to
/utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured
provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK
credential resolution.

Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints.
Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter

Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into
optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing
is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set
api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the
provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host.

Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after
optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.
ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py

Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check

_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently
skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via
multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.)
nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe.

_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses
JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route

mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring)
so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic,
azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the
admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check.

Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read
masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential).

Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used
everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a
passthrough prefix are allowed through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures

- key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so
  team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields.
  can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team
  membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin
  check on a team key means the caller was authorized.

- test: set created_by on mock key in
  test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so
  caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id).

- auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope
  (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into
  UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation.

- ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard
  in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy

scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly.
Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent

auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"]
to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would
remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"),
breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes.
Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/".

migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration
is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column.
Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were
partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including
/team/new) to 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update

caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id ==
caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who
originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget
fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access.

Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion

internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements
(PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper
to bring statement count under the limit.

test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local
"cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so
the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-14 04:16:04 +00:00
Sameer Kankute
18f77ff7bc
feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough (#27834)
* feat(mcp): add delegate_auth_to_upstream flag for PKCE passthrough

Adds an opt-in per-server flag that lets clients (e.g. VS Code) complete
PKCE directly with an upstream OAuth2 MCP server, instead of LiteLLM
double-gating with its own API-key/SSO check. Only honored when
auth_type=oauth2 and the operator explicitly sets the flag; mixed-target
or non-oauth2 requests fail closed.

- Adds the field to Pydantic models, Prisma schema, and a migration
- New MCPRequestHandler._target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream gate
  that runs only when no x-litellm-api-key is present, so authenticated
  users still get user_id resolution + stored-credential lookup
- Anonymous callers now see delegate servers in get_allowed_mcp_servers
  (scoped to delegate servers only; the upstream still enforces auth)
- mcp_management_endpoints: allow anonymous /authorize and /token for
  delegate servers so VS Code can complete PKCE without a LiteLLM session
- UI toggle (shown only for oauth2) + payload/view wiring
- Tests covering: oauth2 on/off, non-oauth2 with flag, mixed targets,
  no resolvable target, explicit key precedence, and 401 emission

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* Enforce oauth2 for delegated MCP auth bypass

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): close secondary Authorization bypass for delegate servers

The delegate-auth bypass gated only on the primary `x-litellm-api-key`
header, so a LiteLLM key sent via `Authorization: Bearer sk-...` (the
secondary header) was silently dropped — skipping spend tracking and
rate limiting. Gate on the resolved litellm_api_key (which considers
both headers) so the bypass fires only when neither is present.

Also update the existing "Authorization header present" test to reflect
that an upstream OAuth token now flows through the existing oauth2
fallback (LiteLLM auth attempt → fail → anonymous), not via the
delegate branch.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* Avoid duplicate MCP OAuth credential lookup

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): block delegate bypass for M2M and internal-only servers

Two security issues flagged in code review:

1. High – client_credentials (M2M) servers must not be delegatable:
   LiteLLM auto-fetches the upstream token using stored credentials, so
   allowing anonymous bypass would let any external caller invoke tools
   authenticated as LiteLLM's service account.
   Fix: check `server.has_client_credentials` in
   `_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream`, the anonymous
   allow-list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`, and `_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth`.

2. Medium – internal-only servers exposed to public internet:
   The anonymous delegate allow-list was not filtering by
   `available_on_public_internet`, so external callers with an upstream
   OAuth token could invoke tools on servers marked internal-only.
   Fix: add `available_on_public_internet` guard to the anonymous
   delegate server list in `get_allowed_mcp_servers`.

Tests added for both cases.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* Require public MCP delegate auth servers

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): align delegate auth path parsing with downstream routing

`_extract_target_server_names_from_path` used a naive segments-based
split while `server.py::_get_mcp_servers_in_path` uses a regex that
allows server names with one embedded slash and comma-separated lists.
With the old parser, a request to `/mcp/<delegated>/<garbage>` was
parsed as targeting `<delegated>` by the auth gate (bypassing LiteLLM
auth) while the routing layer parsed it as `<delegated>/<garbage>` —
when that name did not resolve, the request fell back to the anonymous
allow-list, which can include `allow_all_keys` servers that normally
require a LiteLLM key.

Replace the parser with the same regex logic as
`_get_mcp_servers_in_path` so auth gating sees the exact target name(s)
downstream routing sees. Add regression tests covering parser parity
and the specific extra-path-segment bypass attempt.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9

* fix(mcp): close header/path TOCTOU in MCP delegate auth gate

`_target_servers_delegate_auth_to_upstream` and
`_target_servers_use_oauth2` trusted the `x-mcp-servers` header when
present, but `server.py::extract_mcp_auth_context` overrides that
header with the path-derived list for `/mcp/...` routes. An attacker
could set `x-mcp-servers: <delegated>` while pointing the URL path at
a non-delegate server, flipping the auth gate without changing the
target downstream routing actually uses.

Extract a shared `_resolve_target_server_names` helper that mirrors
the downstream override (path-derived names for `/mcp/...` routes,
header value otherwise). Add regression tests covering the TOCTOU
attempt and the helper's path-vs-header precedence.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9

* Fix delegated MCP OAuth test mock

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): drop unreachable /{server}/mcp branch in auth path parser

`_extract_target_server_names_from_path` also matched the
``/{server_name}/mcp`` form, but the downstream parser
``_get_mcp_servers_in_path`` only handles ``/mcp/...`` — and
``dynamic_mcp_route`` in ``proxy_server`` rewrites ``/{name}/mcp``
to ``/mcp/{name}`` on the scope before the MCP handler runs. Parsing
the un-rewritten form on the auth side was therefore unreachable in
production, and contradicted the docstring's claim of mirroring the
downstream parser — exactly the kind of mismatch that risks a future
header/path TOCTOU if any new entry point skips the rewrite.

Drop the branch; the canonical ``/mcp/...`` path matches both
parsers. Update the regression test to assert the new behavior.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9

* Fix MCP path auth target resolution

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

* fix(mcp): require auth for refresh_token grants on delegate-auth servers

`_mcp_oauth_user_api_key_auth` gates the unauthenticated PKCE flow for
``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` servers, but the bypass applied to BOTH
``/authorize`` and ``/token`` regardless of grant type. ``mcp_token``
accepts ``grant_type=refresh_token`` as well as ``authorization_code``,
and ``exchange_token_with_server`` attaches the server's stored
``client_secret`` to whatever is forwarded upstream. An unauthenticated
caller holding a refresh token issued to that OAuth client could mint
fresh upstream access tokens through LiteLLM.

Limit the anonymous bypass on ``/token`` to ``grant_type=authorization_code``
(the only grant PKCE actually protects via ``code_verifier``); fall
through to normal LiteLLM auth for ``refresh_token`` and any other grant.
``/authorize`` continues to allow anonymous PKCE redirects.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9

* fix(ui): clear delegate_auth_to_upstream when switching off oauth2

The ``delegate_auth_to_upstream`` form field is rendered inside an
``isOAuth2 && (...)`` conditional, so the Form.Item unmounts when the
user changes ``auth_type`` away from ``oauth2``. The follow-up
``form.setFieldValue("delegate_auth_to_upstream", false)`` runs after
the field has already deregistered, so ``onFinish`` receives
``undefined`` and the fallback ``?? mcpServer.delegate_auth_to_upstream``
preserved the old ``true``. The flag then persisted in the database for
a non-oauth2 server and silently re-activated if ``auth_type`` was later
switched back to ``oauth2``.

In the edit payload, force the flag to ``false`` whenever
``auth_type !== oauth2``; only trust the form value (and the existing
DB fallback) when the server is actually oauth2. Backend defense-in-depth
already ignores the flag for non-oauth2 servers, but the DB state should
stay clean too.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SjyPmwfmrq8fveFgw9iHW9

* Fix MCP delegate auth reset on edit

Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 12:06:13 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
e84282b7b3
[Infra] Bump deps (#27157)
* bump: version 0.4.70 → 0.4.71

* bump: version 0.1.39 → 0.1.40

* uv lock
2026-05-05 15:58:05 -07:00
user
7faba9656f
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/litellm_internal_staging' into fix/managed-resource-service-account-isolation 2026-05-05 01:38:11 +00:00
user
83971a8712 fix(proxy): normalize managed resource team owner field 2026-05-04 17:05:50 -07:00
user
bfdd786962 chore(deps): refresh dependency locks 2026-05-04 11:36:18 -07:00
user
799d79160a
fix(proxy): match Prisma index names + extend listing to team for user-keyed callers
Two follow-ups to the managed-resource isolation fix:

1. Rename the new composite indexes to match Prisma's auto-generated naming
   convention (`<Table>_created_by_team_id_created_at_idx`). The previous
   `*_team_owner_created_at_idx` names left `prisma migrate diff` reporting
   an outstanding `RENAME INDEX`, failing `test_aaaasschema_migration_check`.

2. Make `build_owner_filter` return an OR clause when the caller has both
   a `user_id` and a `team_id`, so listings include team-shared resources
   the same way `can_access_resource` already permits reading them. Without
   this a user could fetch a team-shared resource by id but never see it
   in their list view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 20:44:51 +00:00
user
84fede37b4
fix(proxy): isolate managed resources for service-account API keys
Service-account API keys are issued without a `user_id`, and managed
file/batch/vector-store ownership checks compared
`resource.created_by == user_api_key_dict.user_id`. Because Python
evaluates `None == None` as True, any service-account key passed
ownership checks for any resource also created without a user id, and
listing endpoints skipped the `created_by` filter entirely when the
caller had no user id — returning every tenant's records.

Replace the bare equality with an identity-aware helper:

- Admins (PROXY_ADMIN, PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY) keep their unscoped view.
- Callers with a `user_id` are scoped to records they created.
- Callers without a `user_id` but with a `team_id` are scoped to records
  created within their team via a new `created_by_team_id` column.
- Callers with no admin role and no identifying ids are denied — the
  listing path returns an empty page without issuing a query.

Schema migration adds `created_by_team_id` to LiteLLM_ManagedFileTable,
LiteLLM_ManagedObjectTable, and LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStoreTable, plus
indexes for the new filter. Writes in BaseManagedResource and the
enterprise managed_files hook now stamp the column from
`user_api_key_dict.team_id`. Reads in `can_user_access_unified_resource_id`,
`can_user_call_unified_file_id`, `can_user_call_unified_object_id`,
`list_user_resources`, `list_user_batches`, and `get_user_created_file_ids`
all delegate to the new helper.

Tests cover the helper in isolation, the base-class listing/access paths,
and the enterprise file-access hook (including a regression test for the
original `None == None` bypass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-01 20:22:37 +00:00
Yuneng Jiang
dd549d9c50
bump: version 0.4.69 → 0.4.70 2026-04-30 21:39:37 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
6588564a88
Merge pull request #26691 from BerriAI/litellm_team_search_credentials_metadata
feat(proxy): add team-level search provider credentials
2026-04-30 08:35:17 +05:30
ishaan-berri
4a7af1ff68
feat(proxy): durable agent workflow run tracking via /v1/workflows/runs (#26793)
* feat(schema): add workflow run tracking tables (LiteLLM_WorkflowRun, LiteLLM_WorkflowEvent, LiteLLM_WorkflowMessage)

* feat(proxy): add /v1/workflows/runs endpoints for durable agent workflow tracking

* feat(proxy): register workflow management router in proxy_server

* docs(workflows): add README for workflow run tracking API

* test(workflows): add unit tests for /v1/workflows/runs endpoints

* fix(workflows): atomic event+status update via tx(), run_id 404 guard, sequence retry on collision

* test(workflows): add tx mock, 404 on unknown run_id, retry-on-collision tests

* fix(workflows): constrain status to Literal enum, rename total→count in list responses

* add tenant isolation and bounded limits to workflow endpoints

* add created_by column and index to LiteLLM_WorkflowRun

* add ownership and bounded-limit tests for workflow endpoints

* Fix workflow run ownership for null owners

* guard prisma import in workflow_management_endpoints

* sync schema.prisma copies with workflow run models

* black: format workflow_management_endpoints.py

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-04-29 17:12:18 -07:00
Sameer Kankute
b5c60d8873
Add migration script 2026-04-29 12:30:10 +05:30
Sameer Kankute
4b03cb68a2
feat(proxy): move search tool access to object permissions
Store search tool allowlists only on object permissions, wire auth/management/UI flows to object_permission.search_tools, and remove legacy team-metadata search credential code and tests.

Made-with: Cursor
2026-04-29 12:29:20 +05:30
Yuneng Jiang
67628a60c3
bump: version 0.4.68 → 0.4.69 2026-04-25 19:30:33 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
4884b0b611
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_yj_apr23
# Conflicts:
#	litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/key_management_endpoints.py
2026-04-25 09:47:47 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
70492cee42
feat(proxy): add /v1/memory CRUD endpoints (#26218)
* feat(proxy): add /v1/memory CRUD endpoints with user/team scoping

New LiteLLM_MemoryTable stores user/team-scoped key/value entries with
optional JSON metadata. Value is a String (LLM-readable text) and metadata
is an optional Json? envelope, matching the Letta + mem0 hybrid model so
future structured fields can be added without a schema migration.

Endpoints:
  POST   /v1/memory         - create
  GET    /v1/memory         - list (caller-scoped; admins see all)
  GET    /v1/memory/{key}   - fetch one
  PUT    /v1/memory/{key}   - upsert
  DELETE /v1/memory/{key}   - delete

Non-admin callers cannot set a user_id/team_id other than their own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(proxy/memory): omit metadata field when None on create

Prisma's Python client rejects `metadata=None` on a `Json?` field with
"A value is required but not set" — the field must be omitted from the
`data` dict entirely to store SQL NULL. Build the create payload
conditionally in both `create_memory` and the PUT-create branch of
`upsert_memory`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): add Memory page to view/manage /v1/memory entries

Adds a new "Memory" sidebar item under Tools so users can see what their
agents have stored. Lists all memories visible to the caller (scoped by
the backend), with a key-search filter, preview column, scope tags, and
view/edit/delete actions. Create modal accepts optional JSON metadata.

- networking.tsx: fetchMemoryList / createMemory / updateMemory / deleteMemory
  wired to the /v1/memory CRUD endpoints.
- MemoryView + MemoryEditModal: new antd-based components (per CLAUDE.md:
  use antd for new UI, not tremor).
- page.tsx + leftnav.tsx: wire the "memory" route + sidebar entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(memory): add key_prefix filter + promote Memory to AI GATEWAY nav

Backend:
- GET /v1/memory now accepts `key_prefix` for Redis-style namespace
  scans (e.g. `?key_prefix=user:`). When both `key` and `key_prefix`
  are passed, `key_prefix` wins.
- Prefix filter sits under the visibility filter in the Prisma where
  clause, so it can never leak rows across user/team scopes.
- New tests: prefix match, and cross-scope isolation (another user's
  `user:*` rows must not appear in the caller's results).

UI:
- Memory moved from a Tools submenu to a top-level AI GATEWAY item
  (alongside Agents, MCP Servers, Skills) — it's an API primitive,
  not a tool-management surface.
- Search box now drives prefix search, matching the Redis mental
  model ("type the namespace, see everything under it").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): enforce unique key per scope by using NULLS NOT DISTINCT

The unique constraint `(key, user_id, team_id)` on LiteLLM_MemoryTable
silently allowed duplicates when user_id or team_id was NULL, because
Postgres treats every NULL as distinct by default (ANSI semantics). A
caller with no team_id could POST the same key three times and get
three rows.

Migration:
1. Dedupe existing rows, keeping the most recent per (key, user_id,
   team_id), using `IS NOT DISTINCT FROM` so NULL == NULL.
2. Drop the old unique index.
3. Recreate it with `NULLS NOT DISTINCT` (Postgres 15+).

No code change: POST already returns 409 on unique-violation error
messages — it just wasn't firing before because the constraint didn't
catch the NULL-team case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): make key globally unique, 409 on any duplicate

Switches from the compound unique `(key, user_id, team_id)` to a simple
`key @unique`. The compound form silently allowed duplicates when
user_id or team_id was NULL (Postgres treats each NULL as distinct), so
callers could POST the same key repeatedly. Globally-unique key means
one row per key, period — any duplicate create → 409.

- schema.prisma (×3): `key String @unique`, drop `@@unique(...)`.
- initial add_memory_table migration: unique index on (key) only.
- Remove the now-unused follow-up NULLS NOT DISTINCT migration.
- Endpoint error message simplified ("already exists" — no "for this scope").
- Test fake's create() now enforces global key uniqueness.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui/memory): full-width layout + user/teams-style columns

- Add `w-full` to the MemoryView outer div so the page fills the
  flex-flex-1 container (was collapsing to intrinsic width).
- Replace the combined "Scope" column with separate User ID / Team ID
  columns, matching the layout of the Users / Teams pages: ID, Name,
  Preview, User ID, Team ID, Updated, Actions.
- IDs render with a truncated mono label + copy-to-clipboard button,
  same pattern as view_users.
- Detail drawer now shows Memory ID / User ID / Team ID as separate
  fields instead of stacked color tags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui/memory): use clean MCP-style ID pill, drop copy icons

The ID / User ID / Team ID columns showed a mono text blob with a
copy-to-clipboard icon next to each value — too busy compared to the
MCP Servers page. Swap the renderer for MCP's pill style:

- Truncated mono ID inside a blue Tailwind pill
  (`font-mono text-blue-600 bg-blue-50 ... rounded-md border`).
- No copy icon. Full ID surfaces via tooltip.
- ID column is a button that opens the detail drawer on click;
  user/team ID pills are static (not clickable).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): address greptile review feedback

Addresses 5 greptile findings (3/5 → higher confidence target):

1. Identity-less orphan rows (P1): non-admin callers with no user_id AND
   no team_id could create rows that the visibility filter would never
   match again. Now rejected up front with 400 — caller must authenticate
   with a scoped key or act as PROXY_ADMIN.

2. Upsert race returning 500 (P1): PUT's check-then-create isn't atomic;
   a concurrent writer could slip a row in between the 404-check and the
   create call. Now catch unique-violation on create, re-read, and fall
   through to update — PUT stays idempotent. If the conflicting row
   belongs to a different scope, surface a 409 instead of 500.

3. PUT-create scope inconsistency (P2): PUT's create branch always used
   the caller's own user_id/team_id, so admins couldn't bootstrap rows
   scoped elsewhere via PUT (only POST). Now PUT-create calls the shared
   `_resolve_scope()` helper, matching POST semantics.

4. Stale schema comment (P2): schema said "Keyed by (key, user_id,
   team_id)" but `key` is globally unique. Updated all three schema
   copies to reflect the actual design.

5. UI silently truncated at 200 (P2): MemoryView fetched pageSize=200
   with no load-more. Swapped to real server-side pagination driven by
   `data.total`; page size is now 50 and the pager is a real AntD
   control.

Also extracts a shared `_resolve_scope()` helper and `_is_unique_violation()`
from create_memory so POST and PUT don't drift on the scope/error logic.

Tests: +3 new (identity-less 400, PUT admin bootstrap, PUT race →
update), 18/18 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): typed Prisma error + explicit-null metadata on PUT

Two more greptile threads from the last review:

- Unique-violation detection was string-matching "Unique"/"UniqueViolation"
  in the exception message, fragile across Prisma/driver versions. Now
  check the typed error `code == "P2002"` first, with string fallback.

- PUT could not distinguish "metadata omitted" from "metadata: null" —
  both parsed as `None`, so callers had no way to clear stored metadata.
  Switch to Pydantic v2's `model_fields_set` to tell which fields the
  caller actually sent; explicit null now clears the column.

New tests:
- explicit null clears metadata
- omitted metadata preserves existing value

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui/memory): send explicit null when user clears metadata

Addresses the remaining P1 from the last greptile review:

When the edit modal's metadata textarea was cleared and saved,
`metadataParsed` stayed `undefined`, `JSON.stringify` dropped the key
entirely, and the backend's `model_fields_set` guard therefore left
the stored metadata untouched — UI showed success but nothing changed.

Now: empty textarea on edit → send explicit `null` so the backend
sees `metadata` in `model_fields_set` and clears the column.
Empty textarea on create still maps to `undefined` (field omitted)
to avoid Prisma's `Json? = None` quirk on insert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui/memory): preserve slashes in key path encoding

The backend route `/v1/memory/{key:path}` supports keys with slashes,
but `encodeURIComponent` encoded `/` as `%2F`. Some proxies (nginx
default, CloudFlare, AWS ALB) reject or re-decode `%2F` mid-flight,
so UI update/delete calls on slash-containing keys could fail or
silently misroute.

New helper `encodeMemoryKeyForPath` splits by `/`, URL-encodes each
segment, then rejoins with literal `/`. Every other unsafe char
(spaces, `?`, `#`, `%`) stays encoded per-segment; slashes stay as
path delimiters, matching what the `:path` converter expects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui/memory): drop misleading client-side column sorters

With server-side pagination, client sorters on `key` and `updated_at`
only reorder the current page while pretending to sort the full
dataset — users would see "sorted by name" but only the visible 50
rows would actually be sorted.

Remove the sorters. The backend already returns rows in
`updated_at DESC` order (sensible default for a memory view), and
users can narrow the result with the key-prefix filter.

Greptile also flagged missing `@@map` on the new model as a
"consistency" issue, but only 1 of 59 tables in this repo uses
`@@map` — the dominant pattern is to rely on Prisma's default
(model name == table name). Skipping that finding as a
false-positive on convention.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): compose visibility + key filters via explicit AND

Greptile P1 (filter-fragility): `where.update(vis)` was semantically
correct today, but dict-merging by key meant any future visibility
filter that grew a new top-level "OR" would silently clobber the
existing key filter.

Compose explicitly instead:

    where = {"AND": [key_filter, vis]}

Applied to both `list_memory` and `_find_memory_for_caller`. When
either side is empty (admin has no visibility filter; list has no
key filter), skip the wrapper and use the non-empty side directly
to keep the generated SQL clean.

Test fake's `_matches` now understands top-level `AND` too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ui/memory): wrap write helpers with react-query useMutation

Previously the Memory view read via `useQuery` but called the raw
create/update/delete fetch helpers directly in handlers, tracking
loading state with a local `submitting` flag and invalidating state
via `refetch()`. That mixes two concerns:

- it skips react-query's mutation state (isPending / isError / isSuccess)
- `refetch()` only retouches the currently-mounted query instance, not
  other cached pages, so navigating back to an older page could show
  stale rows

Switch the three write paths to `useMutation`:

- `createMutation`, `updateMutation`, `deleteMutation` — each owns
  the mutation fn, success toast, and error toast.
- Success handlers invalidate the whole `["memoryList", ...]` prefix
  via `queryClient.invalidateQueries`, so every cached page refetches
  (pagination + filter-aware).
- Refresh button now invalidates instead of `refetch()`, keeping all
  behavior consistent.
- handleSave/handleDelete become thin adapters that call `.mutateAsync`;
  their errors are swallowed locally since the mutation's onError has
  already surfaced the toast.

Also tightened the edit modal's key-field tooltip to reflect the
actual global-unique semantics (was "Unique per user/team scope").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): close cross-user write gap + sanitize 500 errors (Veria)

Addresses two Veria findings:

**High — cross-user memory tampering via team membership.** The
visibility filter uses an OR (`user_id == caller OR team_id == caller`)
so team members can SEE each other's team-scoped rows. That's
intentional for list/get. But because PUT/DELETE used the same filter
to find the target row, any team member could overwrite or delete a
teammate's *personal* row whenever both `user_id` and `team_id` were
stamped on it — broader visibility was being silently treated as
broader authority.

New `_assert_write_access(row, caller)` enforces ownership for
mutations. Non-admin rules:

- The row's `user_id` must match the caller (personal ownership), OR
- The row has no `user_id` and its `team_id` matches the caller's
  team (a "pure team row" intended for shared writes).

Admins bypass the check. The same gate runs in PUT (both regular
and post-race-recovery branches) and DELETE.

**Medium — DB internals leaked through 500 detail.** Every `except`
block was raising `HTTPException(500, detail=str(e))`, which surfaces
Prisma error strings (table/column names, host:port, error class
names) to API callers. New `_internal_error()` helper logs the real
exception server-side and returns a generic, caller-safe `detail`.
Applied to create, list, upsert (general fallthrough), and delete.

Also tightened the race-recovery 409 message to drop the "in a
different scope" wording — the caller never needs to know whose
scope it lives in.

Tests (+5):
- teammate cannot overwrite personal row → 403
- teammate cannot delete personal row → 403
- teammate CAN modify pure team row (no user_id stamped) → 200
- admin bypasses write-auth → 200
- 500 response never echoes Prisma internals (table/host/class names)

25/25 unit tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(memory): require team admin to modify pure team rows

Tightens the write-authorization rule for "pure team rows" (rows with
no user_id stamped, only team_id) to match the pattern used by
team-management endpoints (`_is_user_team_admin` + `_is_user_org_admin_for_team`):

- Plain team members can READ team rows via the OR visibility filter
  (intentional, unchanged).
- Only PROXY_ADMIN, team admins of the row's team_id, or org admins
  for the team's organization may MODIFY them. Plain members get 403.

`_assert_write_access` is now async and takes the prisma_client so it
can fetch the team and run the existing `_is_user_team_admin` /
`_is_user_org_admin_for_team` helpers from
`litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.common_utils`. The org-admin path
is best-effort: it calls `get_user_object`, which depends on the
proxy_server module being initialized, so any exception there is
treated as "not an org admin" rather than crashing the request.

Tests:
- team admin can modify pure team row → 200
- plain team member cannot modify pure team row → 403
- plain team member cannot delete pure team row → 403

Updates the test fake to add a tiny `litellm_teamtable.find_unique`
implementation and a `_make_team(team_id, admin_user_ids=[...])`
helper.

27/27 unit tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: mypy + UI page-metadata sync for memory page

Two CI failures:

1. mypy: `_find_memory_for_caller` had `key_filter` inferred as
   `dict[str, str]` (literal type) and the conditional `{"AND": [key_filter, vis]}`
   returned `dict[str, list[...]]`, so the join site failed
   `dict-item` typing. Annotate both intermediates as `dict` so mypy
   widens the value type.

2. UI test (`page_utils.test.ts > should have descriptions for all
   pages`): every leftnav entry must have a description in
   `page_metadata.ts`, and `memory` was missing. Added a one-line
   description, matching the style of neighboring entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [Feat] Day-0 support for GPT-5.5 and GPT-5.5 Pro (#26449)

* feat(openai): day-0 support for GPT-5.5 and GPT-5.5 Pro

Add pricing + capability entries for the new GPT-5.5 family launched by
OpenAI on 2026-04-24:

- gpt-5.5 / gpt-5.5-2026-04-23 (chat): $5/$30/$0.50 per 1M
  input/output/cached input
- gpt-5.5-pro / gpt-5.5-pro-2026-04-23 (responses-only): $60/$360/$6
  per 1M input/output/cached input

Other fees (long-context >272k, flex, batches, priority, cache
discounts) follow the same ratios as GPT-5.4, with context window
retained at 1.05M input / 128K output.

No transformation / classifier code changes are required:
OpenAIGPT5Config.is_model_gpt_5_4_plus_model() already matches 5.5+ via
numeric version parsing, and model registration is driven from the
JSON. The existing responses-API bridge for tools + reasoning_effort
(litellm/main.py:970) already covers gpt-5.5-pro.

Tests:
- GPT5_MODELS regression list now covers gpt-5.5-pro and dated variants
- New test_generic_cost_per_token_gpt55_pro cost-calc test
- Updated test_generic_cost_per_token_gpt55 for long-context fields

* fix(openai): mirror reasoning_effort flags onto gpt-5.5 dated variants

gpt-5.5-2026-04-23 and gpt-5.5-pro-2026-04-23 were missing the
supports_none_reasoning_effort, supports_xhigh_reasoning_effort, and
supports_minimal_reasoning_effort flags that their non-dated
counterparts define. Reasoning-effort routing in OpenAIGPT5Config is
fully capability-driven from these JSON flags — since an absent flag
is treated as False for opt-in levels (xhigh), users pinning to a
dated snapshot would silently lose xhigh support and diverge from the
base alias on logprobs + flexible temperature handling.

Copy the flags onto both dated variants so every dated snapshot
inherits the base model's reasoning-effort capability profile.

Adds a parametrized regression test that asserts
supports_{none,minimal,xhigh}_reasoning_effort parity between each
dated variant and its non-dated counterpart, preventing future drift
when new snapshots are added.

* fix(schema): close LiteLLM_MemoryTable model brace dropped during merge

The rebase against `litellm_internal_staging` (which added
`LiteLLM_AdaptiveRouterState` / `LiteLLM_AdaptiveRouterSession`) left
the closing brace of `LiteLLM_MemoryTable` missing in all three
schema copies — the next model declaration ended up parsed as a field
of the memory table, surfacing as the CI prisma error:

    error: This line is not a valid field or attribute definition.
      -->  schema.prisma:1250
       |
    1249 | // Per-(router, request_type, model) Beta posterior for the adaptive router.
    1250 | model LiteLLM_AdaptiveRouterState {

Add the missing `}` (and the standard blank line) after the memory
table's `@@index([team_id])` in `schema.prisma`,
`litellm/proxy/schema.prisma`, and
`litellm-proxy-extras/litellm_proxy_extras/schema.prisma`.

`prisma generate --schema litellm/proxy/schema.prisma` now runs clean;
27/27 memory unit tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-24 18:38:07 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
1a3db6dfa4
Merge pull request #26365 from stuxf/fix/deps-security-bumps
chore(deps): bump vulnerable dependencies
2026-04-24 13:02:58 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
3c3ef7ec9f
Merge pull request #26369 from stuxf/fix/license-metadata
chore(packaging): declare MIT license in litellm-proxy-extras metadata
2026-04-24 13:01:52 -07:00
user
5ba6bc0784
chore(deps): bump uv to 0.11.7 + drop dead npm sed
- UV_IMAGE across all Dockerfiles: 0.10.9 -> 0.11.7.
- Loosen `required-version` in enterprise/ and litellm-proxy-extras/
  from strict `==0.10.9` to `>=0.10.9` so the new Docker image can
  build those workspace members. Matches the main pyproject range.
- Drop the `sed` block that rewrote tar/minimatch version ranges in
  npm's bundled package.json files. The override loop above already
  swaps the vendored directories on disk; npm doesn't re-resolve at
  runtime, so the sed was cosmetic.
2026-04-24 00:36:59 +00:00
user
d60734392b
chore(packaging): declare MIT license in litellm-proxy-extras metadata
litellm-proxy-extras ships a LICENSE file with MIT terms but did not
declare a `license` SPDX expression in its pyproject.toml, so tools
that read the metadata (PyPI, Nexus IQ, pip-licenses) reported
License-None for every published version. Add the explicit expression
so downstream scanners resolve the declared license.
2026-04-23 23:57:22 +00:00
yuneng-jiang
6a25866f51
Merge pull request #26295 from BerriAI/yj_bump_apr22
[Infra] bump versions
2026-04-22 18:33:03 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
3ddb3cbdf6
bump: version 0.4.67 → 0.4.68 2026-04-22 18:20:21 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri
c4c1861389
Merge pull request #26195 from BerriAI/litellm_team_member_total_spend
Track per-member total spend on team memberships
2026-04-22 18:20:16 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
24aec61e4b
Merge pull request #26049 from BerriAI/litellm_adaptive_routing
Litellm adaptive routing
2026-04-22 08:52:51 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
f1da202d9e fix(adaptive_router): P1 flusher hot-reload + P2 hook accumulation + CI
P1: start the adaptive-router flusher loop unconditionally at proxy boot
instead of gating on 'adaptive_routers is non-empty'. Adaptive routers
added via /config/reload after boot now have their queues drained.
State is lazy-loaded per router on first flush tick (new _state_loaded
flag on AdaptiveRouter) so hot-reloaded routers still get their
persisted priors.

P2: _finalize_adaptive_router_if_configured now prunes stale
AdaptiveRouterPostCallHook callbacks from every litellm callback list
before registering new ones. Without this, every Router replacement
left the old hooks wired up in litellm.callbacks and double-fired
signal recording for every request. Uses
logging_callback_manager.remove_callbacks_by_type (same pattern as the
semantic tool filter).

CI fixes:
- black --check failure: reformatted litellm/router.py
- schema migration diff: aligned @@index with the explicit index name
  ('idx_adaptive_router_session_activity') from the original migration
  by adding 'map:' to all three schema.prisma copies. No new migration
  needed.

Tests: 1 new covering the prune-on-hot-reload path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 17:49:38 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
5dc2926a1e
Merge pull request #26194 from BerriAI/litellm_fix_migration_thrashing
[Feature] Proxy: opt-in v2 migration resolver
2026-04-21 16:55:54 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
ecd9a83e61 fix(adaptive_router): P2 review items — @updatedAt + snapshot samples
- Mark last_updated_at (AdaptiveRouterState) and last_activity_at
  (AdaptiveRouterSession) with @updatedAt so Prisma refreshes the
  timestamps on every write. Without this the fields stayed frozen at
  INSERT time and the last_activity_at index was misleading for any
  future TTL/eviction logic. Applied to all three schema.prisma copies;
  no migration SQL change needed (Prisma @updatedAt is a client-side
  annotation that doesn't touch DDL).

- get_state_snapshot: report cell.total_samples instead of alpha+beta
  for the 'samples' field. The previous value inflated every cell by
  the COLD_START_MASS prior (e.g. showed 10.0 before any real traffic
  arrived), which confused operators reading /adaptive_router/.../state.
  Updated docs + the snapshot test to match.

Also fixes two pre-existing merge-break syntax errors in router.py
(missing ')' on the AdaptiveRouter TYPE_CHECKING import; truncated
async_pre_routing_hook dispatch call for the adaptive router branch)
that were masking the rest of the file from the interpreter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 16:27:01 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
c7342bdc4f
Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_adaptive_routing 2026-04-21 16:22:38 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
2b8b9502d9
[Fix] v2 resolver: swallow non-connection DB errors; wrap resolve failures
Addresses two further Greptile findings:

- `_warn_if_db_ahead_of_head` only caught `psycopg.OperationalError`.
  Non-connection DB errors (e.g. `InsufficientPrivilege` / 42501 if the
  runtime DB user lacks SELECT on `_prisma_migrations`) would propagate
  uncaught and crash startup — contradicting the docstring's
  "informational only, never blocks" guarantee. Widen the catch to
  `psycopg.DatabaseError` so all DB-layer errors are swallowed.

- In the P3009 and P3018 idempotent-recovery paths, the call to
  `_resolve_specific_migration(name)` was not wrapped in its own
  try/except. Being inside an active `except CalledProcessError`
  handler, a new `CalledProcessError` from the resolve call would NOT
  re-enter the same handler — it would propagate out as
  `CalledProcessError`, past `proxy_cli.py`'s `except RuntimeError`,
  crashing startup with an unhandled traceback instead of the intended
  clean `sys.exit(2)`. Wrap both call sites to convert to RuntimeError.

Adds unit tests for both behaviors.
2026-04-21 15:53:07 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
9049f37864
[Fix] v2 migration resolver: address Greptile review findings
- Open the psycopg connection in `_warn_if_db_ahead_of_head` with
  autocommit=True. Without it, psycopg3's `with conn` calls COMMIT on
  clean exit, which fails after the `UndefinedTable` (fresh-DB) branch
  left the transaction in an aborted state — crashing first-run startups.

- Wrap the v2 `prisma db push` path in try/except and raise RuntimeError
  on CalledProcessError/TimeoutExpired. Otherwise these propagate past
  proxy_cli.py's `except RuntimeError` as unhandled tracebacks.

- Reword the loop-exhaustion error to cover the non-timeout exit path
  (repeated P3005/P3009/P3018 idempotent-recovery `continue`s), not
  just persistent timeouts.

Adds a unit test for the db_push error wrapping.
2026-04-21 15:34:24 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
a16c00e22c
[Feature] Proxy: opt-in v2 migration resolver (--use_v2_migration_resolver)
Default behavior (v1) is unchanged. Users who have seen schema thrashing
during rolling deploys can opt into the v2 resolver with
`--use_v2_migration_resolver`.

Why v2 is safer:
- Runs `prisma migrate deploy` only.
- Recovers from P3005 (baseline) and idempotent P3009/P3018 errors, same
  as v1.
- Never calls `_resolve_all_migrations`, which generates a schema diff
  between the live DB and the shipped schema.prisma and applies it via
  `prisma db execute`. That path bypassed every migration's SQL and was
  the root cause of thrashing when two LiteLLM versions contended for
  the same DB.
- Logs a non-blocking warning when the DB has migrations applied that
  are newer than anything this build ships (ahead-of-HEAD). It does not
  refuse to start — many users have unusual ledger state from past
  thrashing, and blocking startup would be a breaking change.

Also prints a message on startup when the default (v1) resolver is in
use, pointing operators at the opt-in flag.

Adds unit tests covering the v2 fail-fast paths, the stripping of
Prisma-specific query params from DATABASE_URL (needed for psycopg),
the timestamp helpers, and pins the default: v1 still invokes
`_resolve_all_migrations`, v2 must not.
2026-04-21 14:20:35 -07:00
Ryan Crabbe
e5f3e15969
Track per-member total spend on team memberships
Adds total_spend column to LiteLLM_TeamMembership that accumulates
continuously and is not zeroed by the budget cycle reset job. This
enables UI surfaces to distinguish current-cycle spend (the existing
spend column, which resets) from lifetime spend per team member.

Also exposes budget_reset_at on LiteLLM_BudgetTable so /team/info
callers can see when a member's budget window next resets. The field
was already stored in the DB but stripped by the response Pydantic
model.

Includes regression tests that:
- Guard the reset job against ever writing total_spend: 0
- Verify the spend writer increments both spend and total_spend in
  one UPDATE statement.
2026-04-21 13:56:44 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
b39f210a6c
[Infra] Add freshness and destructive guards to migration workflow
Generating a migration from a stale branch could silently emit DROP
COLUMN for columns the stale branch did not know about, and the
script would write that SQL to a new migration file with no warning.

Adds two guards to ci_cd/run_migration.py:

- Branch freshness check: fetches origin/<base-branch> and exits 3 if
  HEAD is behind. Default base is litellm_internal_staging. New
  flags: --base-branch, --skip-freshness-check.
- Destructive guard: refuses (exit 2) if the generated diff contains
  DROP COLUMN / DROP TABLE / DROP INDEX, unless --allow-destructive
  is passed.

Refusal banners include guidance and an explicit callout instructing
AI agents not to auto-bypass the flags. Also treats Prisma's
"-- This is an empty migration." output as a no-op rather than
writing an empty file.

Updates litellm-proxy-extras/migration_runbook.md with the new
workflow, flag documentation, and agent warnings.
2026-04-21 12:00:23 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
b6fc75b3ce
Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_adaptive_routing 2026-04-20 15:28:08 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
fba736ca3c fix(adaptive_router): 3 P1 review defects
- Use 'auto_router/adaptive_router' prefix in example yaml, docs, and
  README — the old 'adaptive_router/...' and 'openai/gpt-4o-mini' values
  silently skipped adaptive-router init because detection requires the
  'auto_router/adaptive_router' prefix.

- Read x-litellm-min-quality-tier from request headers (and the
  'min_quality_tier' metadata key as fallback) in async_pre_routing_hook.
  Previously the documented header was defined but never extracted, so
  the quality-floor feature was inert.

- Evict expired entries from _session_states. The cache grew without
  bound — added a parallel expiry map (same TTL as _owner_cache) and an
  opportunistic bulk sweep when the cache crosses a size threshold.

- Align adaptive-router migration SQL with Prisma schema: all count
  columns and the 'clean_credit_awarded' / 'last_processed_turn' fields
  are NOT NULL in the data model, so the migration now declares them
  NOT NULL. Fixes test_aaaasschema_migration_check.

Tests: 8 new covering header/metadata/precedence/invalid-value paths for
min_quality_tier and TTL-based eviction of _session_states.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 15:22:18 -07:00
ishaan-berri
2f22a1293e
bump litellm-proxy-extras to 0.4.67 (#26043)
* bump litellm-proxy-extras version to 0.4.67

* bump litellm-proxy-extras pin to 0.4.67 in litellm pyproject

* regenerate uv.lock for litellm-proxy-extras 0.4.67

* bump litellm-enterprise version to 0.1.38

* bump litellm-enterprise pin to 0.1.38 in litellm pyproject

* regenerate uv.lock for litellm-enterprise 0.1.38
2026-04-18 19:03:56 -07:00
Krrish Dholakia
dd4a1d2be2 feat: add adaptive routing to litellm
allow model routing to improve based on conversation signals

ensures router is picking best model for task
2026-04-18 16:35:17 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
e6a20af646
fix(proxy-extras): skip post-deploy sanity check when no migrations pending
When prisma migrate deploy reports 'No pending migrations to apply' the DB
already matches schema — running _resolve_all_migrations (migrate diff +
prisma db execute) adds 25+ seconds unnecessarily, causing the proxy to
miss the 90-second startup timeout in test_litellm_proxy_server_config_no_general_settings.
2026-04-17 15:59:41 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
33175a8ee7
fix(proxy-extras): fall back to prisma db execute when migrate diff fails on pooler URL
When DIRECT_URL is not set and DATABASE_URL is a Neon pooler URL, prisma migrate diff
fails (pooler doesn't support extended query protocol for schema introspection). Previously
_resolve_all_migrations returned early without applying any migrations, leaving the
budget_limits column missing and causing test_auth_callback_new_user to fail.

Now falls back to running each migration SQL file via prisma db execute --file, which
works with pooler URLs and is safe to re-run due to IF NOT EXISTS guards.
2026-04-17 15:38:48 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
33a2cee4af
fix(proxy-extras): use DIRECT_URL for prisma migrate diff, tempfile for diff dir 2026-04-17 15:17:15 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
7c47bbd226
fix(migration): run schema sanity check after P3009/P3018 idempotent migration recovery 2026-04-17 15:01:10 -07:00
Ishaan Jaffer
9281147a1a
fix(schema): add budget_limits Json? to LiteLLM_TeamTable and LiteLLM_VerificationToken 2026-04-17 14:47:18 -07:00