[Docs] Add cosign Docker image verification steps to security blog posts (#25122)
* docs(blog): add cosign Docker image verification instructions Add steps for verifying Docker images with cosign to three security blog posts: CI/CD v2, Security Townhall, and Security Update. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(proxy): add cosign verification to Docker/Helm/Terraform deploy page Add image signature verification steps to the main deployment doc so users pulling Docker images know how to verify them with cosign. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: fixes * Update index.md Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * [Docs] Scope cosign signing docs to GHCR and specify starting version Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [Docs] Add starting version callout to ci_cd_v2 blog post Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish+github@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d251238bd7
commit
39c1042258
0
.github/workflows/run_llm_translation_tests.py
vendored
Executable file → Normal file
0
.github/workflows/run_llm_translation_tests.py
vendored
Executable file → Normal file
12
.trivyignore
12
.trivyignore
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
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# LiteLLM Trivy Ignore File
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# CVEs listed here are temporarily allowlisted pending fixes
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# Next.js vulnerabilities in UI dashboard (next@14.2.35)
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# Allowlisted: 2026-01-31, 7-day fix timeline
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# Fix: Upgrade to Next.js 15.5.10+ or 16.1.5+
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# HIGH: DoS via request deserialization
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GHSA-h25m-26qc-wcjf
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# MEDIUM: Image Optimizer DoS
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CVE-2025-59471
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@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
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ignore:
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- vulnerability: CVE-2026-22184
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reason: no fixed zlib package is available yet in the Wolfi repositories, so this is ignored temporarily until an upstream release exists
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# Wolfi base image: Python 3.13 and Node from apk have no fixed builds in Wolfi yet / not applicable
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-55130
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-59465
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-55131
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-59466
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: CVE-2026-21637
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-55132
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reason: Node in Wolfi apk; only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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- vulnerability: GHSA-hx9q-6w63-j58v
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reason: orjson dumps recursion; allowlisted
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- vulnerability: GHSA-73rr-hh4g-fpgx
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reason: diff npm transitive dep; override in package.json, allowlisted
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- vulnerability: CVE-2026-0865
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-15282
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2026-0672
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-15366
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-15367
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-11468
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2025-12781
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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- vulnerability: CVE-2026-1299
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reason: Python 3.13 in Wolfi base; no fixed apk build yet
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@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# Security Scans Script for LiteLLM
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# This script runs comprehensive security scans including Trivy and Grype
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set -e
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echo "Starting security scans for LiteLLM..."
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# Function to install Trivy and required tools
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install_trivy() {
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echo "Installing Trivy and required tools..."
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TRIVY_VERSION="0.35.0"
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sudo apt-get update
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sudo apt-get install -y wget jq curl bsdmainutils
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wget -qO trivy.deb "https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/releases/download/v${TRIVY_VERSION}/trivy_${TRIVY_VERSION}_Linux-64bit.deb"
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sudo dpkg -i trivy.deb
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rm trivy.deb
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echo "Trivy ${TRIVY_VERSION} installed successfully"
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}
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# Function to install Grype
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install_grype() {
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echo "Installing Grype..."
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curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/grype/main/install.sh | sudo sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
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echo "Grype installed successfully"
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}
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# Function to install ggshield
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install_ggshield() {
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echo "Installing ggshield..."
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pip3 install --upgrade pip
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pip3 install ggshield
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echo "ggshield installed successfully"
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}
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# # Function to run secret detection scans
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# run_secret_detection() {
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# echo "Running secret detection scans..."
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# if ! command -v ggshield &> /dev/null; then
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# install_ggshield
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# fi
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# # Check if GITGUARDIAN_API_KEY is set (required for CI/CD)
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# if [ -z "$GITGUARDIAN_API_KEY" ]; then
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# echo "Warning: GITGUARDIAN_API_KEY environment variable is not set."
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# echo "ggshield requires a GitGuardian API key to scan for secrets."
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# echo "Please set GITGUARDIAN_API_KEY in your CI/CD environment variables."
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# exit 1
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# fi
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# echo "Scanning codebase for secrets..."
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# echo "Note: Large codebases may take several minutes due to API rate limits (50 requests/minute on free plan)"
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# echo "ggshield will automatically handle rate limits and retry as needed."
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# echo "Binary files, cache files, and build artifacts are excluded via .gitguardian.yaml"
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# # Use --recursive for directory scanning and auto-confirm if prompted
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# # .gitguardian.yaml will automatically exclude binary files, wheel files, etc.
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# # GITGUARDIAN_API_KEY environment variable will be used for authentication
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# echo y | ggshield secret scan path . --recursive || {
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# echo ""
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# echo "=========================================="
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# echo "ERROR: Secret Detection Failed"
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# echo "=========================================="
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# echo "ggshield has detected secrets in the codebase."
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# echo "Please review discovered secrets above, revoke any actively used secrets"
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# echo "from underlying systems and make changes to inject secrets dynamically at runtime."
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# echo ""
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# echo "For more information, see: https://docs.gitguardian.com/secrets-detection/"
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# echo "=========================================="
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# echo ""
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# exit 1
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# }
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# echo "Secret detection scans completed successfully"
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# }
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# Function to run Trivy scans
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run_trivy_scans() {
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echo "Running Trivy scans..."
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echo "Scanning LiteLLM Docs..."
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trivy fs --ignorefile .trivyignore --scanners vuln --dependency-tree --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL,MEDIUM ./docs/
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echo "Scanning LiteLLM UI..."
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trivy fs --ignorefile .trivyignore --scanners vuln --dependency-tree --exit-code 1 --severity HIGH,CRITICAL,MEDIUM ./ui/
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echo "Trivy scans completed successfully"
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}
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# Function to build and scan Docker images with Grype
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run_grype_scans() {
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echo "Running Grype scans..."
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# Temporarily add wheel files to .dockerignore for security scans
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echo "Temporarily modifying .dockerignore to exclude problematic wheel files..."
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cp .dockerignore .dockerignore.backup 2>/dev/null || touch .dockerignore.backup
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echo "/*.whl" >> .dockerignore
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# Build and scan Dockerfile.database
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echo "Building and scanning Dockerfile.database..."
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docker build --no-cache -t litellm-database:latest -f ./docker/Dockerfile.database .
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grype litellm-database:latest --config ci_cd/.grype.yaml --fail-on critical
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# Build and scan main Dockerfile
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echo "Building and scanning main Dockerfile..."
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docker build --no-cache -t litellm:latest .
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grype litellm:latest --config ci_cd/.grype.yaml --fail-on critical
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# Restore original .dockerignore
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echo "Restoring original .dockerignore..."
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mv .dockerignore.backup .dockerignore
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# Scan the locally built LiteLLM image for vulnerabilities with CVSS >= 4.0
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echo "Scanning locally built LiteLLM image for high-severity vulnerabilities..."
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echo "Using locally built image: litellm:latest"
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# Allowlist of CVEs to be ignored in failure threshold/reporting
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# - CVE-2025-8869: Not applicable on Python >=3.13 (PEP 706 implemented); pip fallback unused; no OS-level fix
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# - GHSA-4xh5-x5gv-qwph: GitHub Security Advisory alias for CVE-2025-8869
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# - GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2: glob CLI command injection via -c/--cmd; glob CLI is not used in the litellm runtime image,
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# and the vulnerable versions are pulled in only via OS-level/node tooling outside of our application code
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ALLOWED_CVES=(
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"CVE-2025-8869"
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"GHSA-4xh5-x5gv-qwph"
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"CVE-2025-8291" # no fix available as of Oct 11, 2025
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"GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2"
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"CVE-2025-13836" # Python 3.13 HTTP response reading OOM/DoS - no fix available in base image
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"CVE-2025-12084" # Python 3.13 xml.dom.minidom quadratic algorithm - no fix available in base image
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"CVE-2025-60876" # BusyBox wget HTTP request splitting - no fix available in Chainguard Wolfi base image
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"CVE-2026-0861" # Wolfi glibc still flagged even on 2.42-r5; upstream patched build unavailable yet
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"CVE-2010-4756" # glibc glob DoS - awaiting patched Wolfi glibc build
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"CVE-2019-1010022" # glibc stack guard bypass - awaiting patched Wolfi glibc build
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"CVE-2019-1010023" # glibc ldd remap issue - awaiting patched Wolfi glibc build
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"CVE-2019-1010024" # glibc ASLR mitigation bypass - awaiting patched Wolfi glibc build
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"CVE-2019-1010025" # glibc pthread heap address leak - awaiting patched Wolfi glibc build
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"CVE-2026-22184" # zlib untgz buffer overflow - untgz unused + no fixed Wolfi build yet
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"GHSA-58pv-8j8x-9vj2" # jaraco.context path traversal - setuptools vendored only (v5.3.0), not used in application code (using v6.1.0+)
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"GHSA-34x7-hfp2-rc4v" # node-tar hardlink path traversal - not applicable, tar CLI not exposed in application code
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"GHSA-r6q2-hw4h-h46w" # node-tar not used by application runtime, Linux-only container, not affect by macOS APFS-specific exploit
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"GHSA-8rrh-rw8j-w5fx" # wheel is from chainguard and will be handled by then TODO: Remove this after Chainguard updates the wheel
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"CVE-2025-59465" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2025-55131" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2025-59466" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2025-55130" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2025-59467" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2026-21637" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"CVE-2025-55132" # Node only used for Admin UI build/prisma
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"GHSA-hx9q-6w63-j58v" # orjson dumps recursion; allowlisted
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"CVE-2025-15281" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2026-0865" # No fix available yet
|
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"CVE-2025-15282" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2026-0672" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2025-15366" # No fix available yet
|
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"CVE-2025-15367" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2025-12781" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2025-11468" # No fix available yet
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"CVE-2026-1299" # Python 3.13 email module header injection - not applicable, LiteLLM doesn't use BytesGenerator for email serialization
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"CVE-2026-0775" # npm cli incorrect permission assignment - no fix available yet, npm is only used at build/prisma-generate time
|
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"GHSA-3ppc-4f35-3m26" # minimatch ReDoS via repeated wildcards - from nodejs_wheel bundled npm, not used in application runtime code
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"GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx" # tar arbitrary file read/write via hardlink - from nodejs_wheel bundled npm, not used in application runtime code
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"CVE-2026-2297" # Python 3.13 SourcelessFileLoader audit hook bypass - no fix available in base image
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"GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96" # tar hardlink path traversal - from nodejs_wheel bundled npm, not used in application runtime code
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"CVE-2026-2673" # OpenSSL 3.6.1 TLS 1.3 key exchange group negotiation issue - no fix available yet
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"CVE-2026-3644" # Python 3.13 vulnerability - no fix available in base image
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"CVE-2026-4224" # Python 3.13 Expat parser stack overflow in ElementDeclHandler - no fix available in base image
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)
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# Build JSON array of allowlisted CVE IDs for jq
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ALLOWED_IDS_JSON=$(printf '%s\n' "${ALLOWED_CVES[@]}" | jq -R . | jq -s .)
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echo "Checking for vulnerabilities with CVSS score >= 4.0..."
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echo "Allowlisted CVEs (ignored in threshold): ${ALLOWED_CVES[*]}"
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echo ""
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||||
|
||||
# Show all high-severity vulnerabilities for transparency
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TOTAL_HIGH_SEVERITY=$(grype litellm:latest -o json | jq -r '
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.matches[]
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| select(.vulnerability.cvss[]?.metrics.baseScore >= 4.0)
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| .vulnerability.id' | wc -l)
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if [ "$TOTAL_HIGH_SEVERITY" -gt 0 ]; then
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echo "Total vulnerabilities found with CVSS >= 4.0: $TOTAL_HIGH_SEVERITY"
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echo ""
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||||
echo "All high-severity vulnerabilities (including allowlisted):"
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grype litellm:latest -o json | jq --argjson allow "$ALLOWED_IDS_JSON" -r '
|
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["Package", "Version", "Vulnerability ID", "CVSS Score", "Allowlisted"],
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(.matches[]
|
||||
| select(.vulnerability.cvss[]?.metrics.baseScore >= 4.0)
|
||||
| [.artifact.name, .artifact.version, .vulnerability.id, .vulnerability.cvss[0].metrics.baseScore, (if (.vulnerability.id as $id | $allow | index($id)) then "YES" else "NO" end)])
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||||
| @tsv' | column -t -s $'\t'
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echo ""
|
||||
fi
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HIGH_SEVERITY_COUNT=$(grype litellm:latest -o json | jq --argjson allow "$ALLOWED_IDS_JSON" -r '
|
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.matches[]
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| select(.vulnerability.cvss[]?.metrics.baseScore >= 4.0)
|
||||
| select((.vulnerability.id as $id | $allow | index($id) | not))
|
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| .vulnerability.id' | wc -l)
|
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|
||||
if [ "$HIGH_SEVERITY_COUNT" -gt 0 ]; then
|
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echo ""
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo "ERROR: Security Scan Failed"
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo "Found $HIGH_SEVERITY_COUNT non-allowlisted vulnerabilities with CVSS score >= 4.0 in litellm:latest"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "These vulnerabilities are NOT in the allowlist and must be addressed."
|
||||
echo "Current allowlisted CVEs: ${ALLOWED_CVES[*]}"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Detailed vulnerability report:"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
grype litellm:latest -o json | jq --argjson allow "$ALLOWED_IDS_JSON" -r '
|
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["Package", "Version", "Vulnerability ID", "CVSS Score", "Severity", "Fix Version", "Description"],
|
||||
(.matches[]
|
||||
| select(.vulnerability.cvss[]?.metrics.baseScore >= 4.0)
|
||||
| select((.vulnerability.id as $id | $allow | index($id) | not))
|
||||
| [.artifact.name, .artifact.version, .vulnerability.id, .vulnerability.cvss[0].metrics.baseScore, .vulnerability.severity, (.vulnerability.fix.versions[0] // "No fix available"), .vulnerability.description])
|
||||
| @tsv' | column -t -s $'\t'
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo "Action Required:"
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo "1. If a fix is available, update the package to the fixed version"
|
||||
echo "2. If the vulnerability is not applicable or has no fix:"
|
||||
echo " - Add the CVE/GHSA ID to ALLOWED_CVES array in ci_cd/security_scans.sh"
|
||||
echo " - Add a comment explaining why it's safe to ignore"
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Note: Some vulnerabilities may have multiple IDs (CVE-XXXX and GHSA-XXXX)."
|
||||
echo "Add all relevant IDs to the allowlist if they refer to the same issue."
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "No high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS >= 4.0) found in litellm:latest"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Grype scans completed successfully"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Main execution
|
||||
main() {
|
||||
echo "Installing security scanning tools..."
|
||||
install_trivy
|
||||
install_grype
|
||||
|
||||
# echo "Running secret detection scans..."
|
||||
# run_secret_detection
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Running filesystem vulnerability scans..."
|
||||
run_trivy_scans
|
||||
|
||||
echo "Running Docker image vulnerability scans..."
|
||||
run_grype_scans
|
||||
|
||||
echo "All security scans completed successfully!"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute main function
|
||||
main "$@"
|
||||
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# js-yaml CVE-2025-64718
|
||||
# This vulnerability is not applicable because we've forced js-yaml to version 4.1.1
|
||||
# via npm overrides in package.json. Trivy incorrectly reports this based on
|
||||
# dependency requirements in the lockfile, but the actual installed version is 4.1.1.
|
||||
# Verified with: npm list js-yaml
|
||||
CVE-2025-64718
|
||||
|
||||
@ -27,6 +27,27 @@ Building on the roadmap from our [security incident](https://docs.litellm.ai/blo
|
||||
- Validation and release are separated into different repositories, making it harder for an attacker to reach release credentials.
|
||||
- Trusted Publishing for PyPI releases - this means no long-lived credentials are used to publish releases.
|
||||
- Immutable Docker release tags - this means no tampering of Docker release tags after they are published [Learn more](https://docs.docker.com/docker-hub/repos/manage/hub-images/immutable-tags/). Note: work for GHCR docker releases is planned as well.
|
||||
- Docker image signing with [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) - all release images are signed so users can independently verify they came from us.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verify Docker image signatures
|
||||
|
||||
Starting from `v1.83.0-nightly`, all LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). To verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cosign verify \
|
||||
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
|
||||
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
|
||||
- The cosign claims were validated
|
||||
- The signatures were verified against the specified public key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## What's next
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -143,8 +143,27 @@ This will ensure, your releases are safe, even when:
|
||||
- Tampered registry artifacts are published
|
||||
- Tag mutations are made after the release is published
|
||||
|
||||
We believe that [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is a good fit for this, and have already begun working on it [PR](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/24683).
|
||||
We believe that [Cosign](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign) is a good fit for this, and have shipped it in [PR #24683](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/24683).
|
||||
|
||||
#### How to verify a Docker image with Cosign
|
||||
|
||||
Starting from `v1.83.0-nightly`, all LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). To verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cosign verify \
|
||||
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
|
||||
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
|
||||
- The cosign claims were validated
|
||||
- The signatures were verified against the specified public key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Avoid Compromised Packages
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -708,6 +708,26 @@ The LiteLLM AI Gateway team has already taken the following steps:
|
||||
- Engaged Google's Mandiant security team to assist with forensic analysis of the build and publishing chain
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Verify Docker image signatures
|
||||
|
||||
Starting from `v1.83.0-nightly`, all LiteLLM Docker images published to GHCR are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). To verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cosign verify \
|
||||
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
|
||||
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
|
||||
- The cosign claims were validated
|
||||
- The signatures were verified against the specified public key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Verified safe versions
|
||||
|
||||
We have audited every LiteLLM release published between v1.78.0 and v1.82.6 across both PyPI and Docker. Each artifact was verified by:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -65,7 +65,29 @@ docker compose up
|
||||
</TabItem>
|
||||
</Tabs>
|
||||
|
||||
### Docker Run
|
||||
### Verify Docker image signatures
|
||||
|
||||
All LiteLLM Docker images are signed with [cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/). You can verify the integrity of an image before deploying:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
cosign verify \
|
||||
--key https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/<release-tag>/cosign.pub \
|
||||
ghcr.io/berriai/litellm:<release-tag>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `<release-tag>` with the version you are deploying (e.g. `v1.83.0-stable`).
|
||||
|
||||
Expected output:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
|
||||
- The cosign claims were validated
|
||||
- The signatures were verified against the specified public key
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Learn more about LiteLLM's release signing in the [CI/CD v2 announcement](https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/ci-cd-v2-improvements#verify-docker-image-signatures).
|
||||
|
||||
### Docker Run
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 1. CREATE config.yaml
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# js-yaml CVE-2025-64718
|
||||
# This vulnerability is not applicable because we've forced js-yaml to version 4.1.1
|
||||
# via npm overrides in package.json. Trivy incorrectly reports this based on
|
||||
# dependency requirements in the lockfile, but the actual installed version is 4.1.1.
|
||||
# Verified with: npm list js-yaml
|
||||
CVE-2025-64718
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user