fix: sandbox binding + agent sandbox sync + uuid rotation

api/admin_assume.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"log/slog"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+
+	"account/internal/store"
+)
+
+const (
+	assumeSandboxEmail = sandboxUserEmail
+)
+
+func (h *handler) adminAssume(c *gin.Context) {
+	adminUser, ok := h.requireAdminPermission(c, permissionAdminSettingsWrite)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if !h.isRootAccount(adminUser) {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "root_only", "root only")
+		return
+	}
+
+	var req struct {
+		Email string `json:"email"`
+	}
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&req); err != nil {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_request", "invalid request payload")
+		return
+	}
+
+	email := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.Email))
+	if email != assumeSandboxEmail {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_target", "target is not allowed")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Resolve sandbox user.
+	sandboxUser, err := h.store.GetUserByEmail(c.Request.Context(), assumeSandboxEmail)
+	if err != nil {
+		if err == store.ErrUserNotFound {
+			respondError(c, http.StatusNotFound, "sandbox_missing", "sandbox user not found")
+			return
+		}
+		respondError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "sandbox_lookup_failed", "failed to lookup sandbox user")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Rotate sandbox UUID if expired (hourly forced rotation).
+	if err := h.ensureSandboxProxyUUID(c.Request.Context(), sandboxUser); err != nil {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "sandbox_uuid_rotation_failed", "failed to rotate sandbox uuid")
+		return
+	}
+
+	sandboxToken, expiresAt, err := h.createSession(sandboxUser.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusInternalServerError, "session_creation_failed", "failed to create sandbox session")
+		return
+	}
+
+	slog.Info("admin assume sandbox",
+		"event", "admin_assume",
+		"actor_user_id", adminUser.ID,
+		"actor_email", adminUser.Email,
+		"target_user_id", sandboxUser.ID,
+		"target_email", sandboxUser.Email,
+	)
+
+	// NOTE: cookies are intentionally NOT set by accounts.svc.plus.
+	// The console BFF is responsible for setting host-scoped cookies.
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
+		"ok":        true,
+		"assumed":   assumeSandboxEmail,
+		"token":     sandboxToken,
+		"expiresAt": expiresAt.UTC(),
+	})
+}
+
+func (h *handler) adminAssumeRevert(c *gin.Context) {
+	adminUser, ok := h.requireAdminPermission(c, permissionAdminSettingsWrite)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if !h.isRootAccount(adminUser) {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "root_only", "root only")
+		return
+	}
+
+	slog.Info("admin assume revert",
+		"event", "admin_assume_revert",
+		"actor_user_id", adminUser.ID,
+		"actor_email", adminUser.Email,
+		"target_email", assumeSandboxEmail,
+	)
+
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"ok": true})
+}
+
+func (h *handler) adminAssumeStatus(c *gin.Context) {
+	adminUser, ok := h.requireAdminPermission(c, permissionAdminSettingsRead)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	if !h.isRootAccount(adminUser) {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "root_only", "root only")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// NOTE: assume status is tracked via host-scoped cookies owned by console.svc.plus.
+	// accounts.svc.plus cannot observe that state safely, so we only expose a stub.
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"isAssuming": false, "target": ""})
+}
+
+// guard unused imports if build tags change.
+var _ = context.Background

api/admin_sandbox.go

@@ -86,14 +86,8 @@ func (h *handler) bindSandboxNode(c *gin.Context) {
 
 	// Update the in-memory registry if available
 	if h.agentRegistry != nil {
-		// This should ideally be handled by a more robust event system,
-		// but since it's a single instance (usually), we can just clear and reset.
-		// For now, let's assume the registry will reload if we trigger it or we just set it here.
-		// Wait, Registry needs to know ALL sandbox agents.
-		// I'll update the registry's internal state.
-
-		// First reset all sandbox flags (not supported by current Registry API, let's just set the new one)
-		// TODO: Implement ClearSandboxAgents in Registry
+		// Enforce 1-to-1 binding: clear then set.
+		h.agentRegistry.ClearSandboxAgents()
 		if agentID != "" {
 			h.agentRegistry.SetSandboxAgent(agentID, true)
 		}

api/agent_server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+
+	"account/internal/agentproto"
+	"account/internal/agentserver"
+	"account/internal/store"
+	"account/internal/xrayconfig"
+)
+
+const agentIDHeader = "X-Agent-ID"
+
+func (h *handler) listAgentUsers(c *gin.Context) {
+	if h.agentRegistry == nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "agent_registry_unavailable"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	token := extractToken(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
+	if token == "" {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "missing_token"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	credIdentity, ok := h.agentRegistry.Authenticate(token)
+	if !ok || credIdentity == nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid_token"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	agentID := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader(agentIDHeader))
+	if agentID == "" {
+		agentID = strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("agentId"))
+	}
+	if agentID == "" {
+		agentID = credIdentity.ID
+	}
+
+	identity := *credIdentity
+	if agentID != "" && agentID != identity.ID {
+		// Shared token scenario: register a concrete agent id so sandbox bindings can target it.
+		identity = h.agentRegistry.RegisterAgent(agentID, identity.Groups)
+	}
+
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	clients := make([]xrayconfig.Client, 0, 1)
+
+	if h.agentRegistry.IsSandboxAgent(identity.ID) {
+		sandboxUser, err := h.store.GetUserByEmail(c.Request.Context(), sandboxUserEmail)
+		if err != nil {
+			if err == store.ErrUserNotFound {
+				c.JSON(http.StatusNotFound, gin.H{"error": "sandbox_missing"})
+				return
+			}
+			c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "sandbox_lookup_failed"})
+			return
+		}
+		if err := h.ensureSandboxProxyUUID(c.Request.Context(), sandboxUser); err != nil {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "sandbox_uuid_rotation_failed"})
+			return
+		}
+
+		uuid := strings.TrimSpace(sandboxUser.ProxyUUID)
+		if uuid == "" {
+			uuid = strings.TrimSpace(sandboxUser.ID)
+		}
+		if uuid != "" {
+			clients = append(clients, xrayconfig.Client{
+				ID:    uuid,
+				Email: sandboxUserEmail,
+				Flow:  xrayconfig.DefaultFlow,
+			})
+		}
+
+		c.JSON(http.StatusOK, agentproto.ClientListResponse{
+			Clients:     clients,
+			Total:       len(clients),
+			GeneratedAt: now,
+		})
+		return
+	}
+
+	users, err := h.store.ListUsers(c.Request.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "list_users_failed"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, u := range users {
+		email := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(u.Email))
+		if email == sandboxUserEmail || email == "demo@svc.plus" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !u.Active {
+			continue
+		}
+		if !u.EmailVerified {
+			continue
+		}
+		if u.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt != nil && now.After(*u.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		id := strings.TrimSpace(u.ProxyUUID)
+		if id == "" {
+			id = strings.TrimSpace(u.ID)
+		}
+		if id == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		clients = append(clients, xrayconfig.Client{
+			ID:    id,
+			Email: strings.TrimSpace(u.Email),
+			Flow:  xrayconfig.DefaultFlow,
+		})
+	}
+
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, agentproto.ClientListResponse{
+		Clients:     clients,
+		Total:       len(clients),
+		GeneratedAt: now,
+	})
+}
+
+func (h *handler) reportAgentStatus(c *gin.Context) {
+	if h.agentRegistry == nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "agent_registry_unavailable"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	token := extractToken(c.GetHeader("Authorization"))
+	if token == "" {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "missing_token"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	credIdentity, ok := h.agentRegistry.Authenticate(token)
+	if !ok || credIdentity == nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"error": "invalid_token"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	var report agentproto.StatusReport
+	if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&report); err != nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"error": "invalid_request", "message": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+
+	agentID := strings.TrimSpace(report.AgentID)
+	if agentID == "" {
+		agentID = strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader(agentIDHeader))
+	}
+	if agentID == "" {
+		agentID = credIdentity.ID
+	}
+
+	identity := *credIdentity
+	if agentID != "" && agentID != identity.ID {
+		identity = h.agentRegistry.RegisterAgent(agentID, identity.Groups)
+	}
+
+	// Ensure report uses the resolved agent id.
+	report.AgentID = identity.ID
+	h.agentRegistry.ReportStatus(identity, report)
+
+	c.Status(http.StatusNoContent)
+}
+
+var _ = agentserver.Identity{}

api/api.go

@@ -315,6 +315,18 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine, opts ...Option) {
 	authProtected.POST("/admin/blacklist", h.addToBlacklist)
 	authProtected.DELETE("/admin/blacklist/:email", h.removeFromBlacklist)
 
+	// Sandbox node binding (root-only via permissions guard).
+	authProtected.GET("/admin/sandbox/binding", h.getSandboxBinding)
+	authProtected.POST("/admin/sandbox/bind", h.bindSandboxNode)
+
+	// Public read of sandbox binding for demo/sandbox user experience.
+	authProtected.GET("/sandbox/binding", h.getSandboxBindingPublic)
+
+	// Root-only identity switch to sandbox@svc.plus (hard-coded allowlist).
+	authProtected.POST("/admin/assume", h.adminAssume)
+	authProtected.POST("/admin/assume/revert", h.adminAssumeRevert)
+	authProtected.GET("/admin/assume/status", h.adminAssumeStatus)
+
 	authProtected.GET("/users", h.listUsers)
 
 	// Internal routes for service-to-service reads.
@@ -335,6 +347,8 @@ func RegisterRoutes(r *gin.Engine, opts ...Option) {
 	// stay outside token middleware to support dashboard session tokens.
 	agentServerGroup := r.Group("/api/agent-server/v1")
 	agentServerGroup.GET("/nodes", h.listAgentNodes)
+	agentServerGroup.GET("/users", h.listAgentUsers)
+	agentServerGroup.POST("/status", h.reportAgentStatus)
 
 	// Legacy alias kept for backward compatibility.
 	agentGroup := r.Group("/api/agent")
@@ -992,6 +1006,13 @@ func (h *handler) login(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Sandbox user is not allowed to login by password/totp.
+	// Root can only assume into sandbox via the admin assume endpoint.
+	if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(user.Email), sandboxUserEmail) {
+		respondError(c, http.StatusForbidden, "sandbox_no_login", "sandbox login is disabled")
+		return
+	}
+
 	if password != "" {
 		if bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(user.PasswordHash), []byte(password)) != nil {
 			respondError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_credentials", "invalid credentials")
@@ -1217,6 +1238,11 @@ func (h *handler) session(c *gin.Context) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// Sandbox UUID rotates hourly; refresh on session reads so the UI always sees a valid UUID.
+	if err := h.ensureSandboxProxyUUID(c.Request.Context(), user); err != nil {
+		slog.Warn("failed to rotate sandbox proxy uuid", "err", err, "userID", user.ID)
+	}
+
 	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"user": sanitizeUser(user, nil)})
 }
 
@@ -2658,7 +2684,9 @@ func (h *handler) isReadOnlyAccount(user *store.User) bool {
 	}
 	name := strings.TrimSpace(user.Name)
 	email := strings.TrimSpace(user.Email)
-	if strings.EqualFold(name, "demo") || strings.EqualFold(email, "demo@svc.plus") {
+	if strings.EqualFold(name, "demo") ||
+		strings.EqualFold(email, "demo@svc.plus") ||
+		strings.EqualFold(email, sandboxUserEmail) {
 		return true
 	}
 	for _, group := range user.Groups {

api/sandbox_binding_public.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+
+	"account/internal/model"
+)
+
+// getSandboxBindingPublic returns the currently bound sandbox agent (if any).
+// It is intentionally readable by any authenticated user so demo/sandbox users
+// do not depend on localStorage browser state.
+func (h *handler) getSandboxBindingPublic(c *gin.Context) {
+	if _, ok := h.requireAuthenticatedUser(c); !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if h.db == nil {
+		c.JSON(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, gin.H{"error": "database_not_configured"})
+		return
+	}
+
+	var binding model.SandboxBinding
+	if err := h.db.WithContext(c.Request.Context()).First(&binding).Error; err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"address": "", "updatedAt": int64(0)})
+			return
+		}
+		c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "failed_to_query_binding", "message": err.Error()})
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
+		"address":   binding.AgentID,
+		"updatedAt": binding.UpdatedAt.UnixMilli(),
+	})
+}

api/sandbox_uuid.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"account/internal/store"
+)
+
+const (
+	sandboxUserEmail          = "sandbox@svc.plus"
+	sandboxUUIDRotationWindow = time.Hour
+)
+
+// ensureSandboxProxyUUID enforces hourly rotation of the sandbox user's ProxyUUID.
+// It is intentionally strict: only the hard-coded sandbox email is eligible.
+func (h *handler) ensureSandboxProxyUUID(ctx context.Context, user *store.User) error {
+	if h == nil || user == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	email := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(user.Email))
+	if email != sandboxUserEmail {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	needsRotation := strings.TrimSpace(user.ProxyUUID) == "" ||
+		user.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt == nil ||
+		!now.Before(*user.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt)
+
+	if !needsRotation {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	exp := now.Add(sandboxUUIDRotationWindow)
+	user.ProxyUUID = generateRandomUUID()
+	user.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt = &exp
+	return h.store.UpdateUser(ctx, user)
+}

api/user_agents.go

@@ -63,11 +63,23 @@ func (h *handler) listAgentNodes(c *gin.Context) {
 	}
 
 	if user.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt != nil && time.Now().UTC().After(*user.ProxyUUIDExpiresAt) {
-		c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
-			"error":   "proxy_uuid_expired",
-			"message": "proxy access has expired, please renew",
-		})
-		return
+		// Sandbox rotates hourly; never block it on expiry.
+		if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(user.Email), sandboxUserEmail) {
+			if err := h.ensureSandboxProxyUUID(c.Request.Context(), user); err != nil {
+				c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"error": "sandbox_uuid_rotation_failed"})
+				return
+			}
+			proxyUUID = strings.TrimSpace(user.ProxyUUID)
+			if proxyUUID == "" {
+				proxyUUID = user.ID
+			}
+		} else {
+			c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
+				"error":   "proxy_uuid_expired",
+				"message": "proxy access has expired, please renew",
+			})
+			return
+		}
 	}
 
 	// Add panic recovery for this handler

internal/agentmode/client.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ type ClientOptions struct {
 	Timeout            time.Duration
 	InsecureSkipVerify bool
 	UserAgent          string
+	AgentID            string
 }
 
 // Client issues authenticated requests against the controller.
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ type Client struct {
 	token     string
 	http      *http.Client
 	userAgent string
+	agentID   string
 }
 
 // NewClient constructs a client for the provided controller URL and token.
@@ -73,12 +75,14 @@ func NewClient(baseURL, token string, opts ClientOptions) (*Client, error) {
 	if userAgent == "" {
 		userAgent = "xcontrol-agent"
 	}
+	agentID := strings.TrimSpace(opts.AgentID)
 
 	return &Client{
 		baseURL:   parsed,
 		token:     token,
 		http:      client,
 		userAgent: userAgent,
+		agentID:   agentID,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -148,4 +152,7 @@ func (c *Client) ReportStatus(ctx context.Context, report agentproto.StatusRepor
 func (c *Client) applyHeaders(req *http.Request) {
 	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
 	req.Header.Set("User-Agent", c.userAgent)
+	if c.agentID != "" {
+		req.Header.Set("X-Agent-ID", c.agentID)
+	}
 }

internal/agentmode/runner.go

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options) error {
 		Timeout:            httpTimeout,
 		InsecureSkipVerify: opts.Agent.TLS.InsecureSkipVerify,
 		UserAgent:          buildUserAgent(opts.Agent.ID),
+		AgentID:            opts.Agent.ID,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options) error {
 	wg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer wg.Done()
-		runStatusReporter(reporterCtx, client, tracker, statusInterval, syncInterval, logger)
+		runStatusReporter(reporterCtx, client, tracker, statusInterval, syncInterval, opts.Agent.ID, logger)
 	}()
 
 	<-ctx.Done()
@@ -163,13 +164,13 @@ func buildUserAgent(id string) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("xcontrol-agent/%s", id)
 }
 
-func runStatusReporter(ctx context.Context, client *Client, tracker *syncTracker, interval, syncInterval time.Duration, logger *slog.Logger) {
+func runStatusReporter(ctx context.Context, client *Client, tracker *syncTracker, interval, syncInterval time.Duration, agentID string, logger *slog.Logger) {
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
 	send := func() {
 		snapshot := tracker.Snapshot()
-		report := buildStatusReport(snapshot, syncInterval)
+		report := buildStatusReport(snapshot, syncInterval, agentID)
 		if err := client.ReportStatus(ctx, report); err != nil {
 			logger.Warn("failed to report agent status", "err", err)
 		}
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ func runStatusReporter(ctx context.Context, client *Client, tracker *syncTracker
 	}
 }
 
-func buildStatusReport(snapshot trackerSnapshot, syncInterval time.Duration) agentproto.StatusReport {
+func buildStatusReport(snapshot trackerSnapshot, syncInterval time.Duration, agentID string) agentproto.StatusReport {
 	healthy := snapshot.LastError == "" && !snapshot.LastSuccess.IsZero()
 
 	running := false
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ func buildStatusReport(snapshot trackerSnapshot, syncInterval time.Duration) age
 	}
 
 	report := agentproto.StatusReport{
+		AgentID:      strings.TrimSpace(agentID),
 		Healthy:      healthy,
 		Message:      snapshot.LastError,
 		Users:        snapshot.Clients,